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I. Introductory Part 
1. General Introduction 
When we take a look at the world of the 20th century, it becomes evident that some major 
and determining events shaped the course of the century. At the beginning was World 
War I, which took its starting point with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of 
Austria in Sarajevo and subsequent escalation due to defensive pacts of the global 
player of this time, Germany, France, Great Britain and Russia. World War I was a war 
among the great powers of Europe, but because of their colonies the war spread 
throughout the world. While the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917 and consequently left 
the war, which gave a hope for victory for the overstretched forces of the Central 
Powers, the United States entered it in 1918 and could soon celebrate the victory with its 
allies. The end of World War I finally resulted in the disappearance of four empires – the 
Austrian-Hungarian, the German, the Russian and the Ottoman. In the course of 
reorganizing the map of Europe, the League of Nations was formed as an instrument to 
prevent a similar conflict in the future. The United States under Woodrow Wilson pushed 
for the creation of an organization, whose main goal should be to establish and maintain 
a peaceful world. However, we learned in the course of history that a peaceful world is 
difficult to achieve, especially the U.S. had concerns regarding the peaceful 
reorganization of Europe and refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, which was thought 
of being too harsh and restrictive to Germany and the German people. As well as 
Russia, the U.S. expected the Germans to break loose once again due to the high 
reparations and the general inequity of the peace treaty. Therefore the national party in 
Germany got stronger and the second major event in the 20th century was not long in 
coming. The outbreak of World War II, after Germany attacked Poland in 1939, marked 
another grim chapter in world’s history. Once again the war spread throughout the world 
and the Nazi crimes horrified the international community. This time the United States 
got involved in the war, because of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the end of 
year 1941. Although the U.S. strategy was not to participate directly in the wars of the 
European countries but only to give support through industrial means, it was forced into 
this war by the Japanese activities in the Pacific. The attack on Pearl Harbor crushed the 
last support for anti-war movements in the U.S and just the day after, the U.S declared 
war on Japan. Finally, just like at the end of World War I, the United States along with 
their Allies, celebrated the victory in 1945. Learning from the past, the victors of World 
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War II tried to destroy the industrial and military capability of Germany to start war again 
by splitting it in half, as well as concentrating on a fair peace treaty. This time, another 
organization, which should bring lasting peace to the world, was established – the United 
Nations. It seems like history repeats itself. 
 
In the following years the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union led to a 
nuclear arms race and many proxy wars of the two remaining superpowers. In some 
cases the world was very close to a nuclear world war between the two superpowers, 
like for instance the Cuba-Crisis. Both the leaders of the U.S as well as the Soviet Union 
wanted to show strength to the enemy to prevent eventual aggression from the potential 
enemy. This was a risky behavior. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 did 
not mean the “end of history”, as assumed by Francis Fukuyama.1 The world did not 
become a peaceful place because of the end of the Cold War. The consequence was 
that the United States of America remained the only superpower and therefore 
experienced “a unipolar moment” in the words of Charles Krauthammer.2 
 
However, the end of the 20th century was not marked by peaceful coexistence, but by 
ethnic conflicts and genocide. These new challenges had to be addressed by 
international organizations like the United Nations, and by the United States, as the sole 
superpower capable to do so. New military challenges arose as the enemy changed from 
superpowers and war fighting nations into terror and guerilla warfare. In this uncertain 
time of new challenges for the leaders of the U.S, Bill Clinton became president of the 
United States. He was the first president who was elected after the post-Cold War era 
and therefore he was confronted by a new era of international relations. 
 
The reason for outlining the events of the 20th century is that it was a defining time for the 
foreign policy of the United States. The experiences made during World War I, World 
War II and during the Cold War shaped the world as it was, and shaped what leaders of 
the U.S. wanted the world to be. Furthermore, the first international organizations 
emerged during this time with the aim to prevent global war, which had an enormous 
impact on international relations.  
                                               
1
 Compare: Fukuyama, Francis, The end of history, in: The National Interest, Summer 1989. 
2
 Compare: Krauthammer, Charles, The unipolar moment, in: Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990/1991. 
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The major problems at the end of the 20th century were ethnic conflicts and therefore the 
concerns about human rights increasingly emerged in those years, especially as the 
fighting enemies changed from nations against each other to military or often paramilitary 
groups against civilians. In addition, globalization and new information technologies 
made the public worldwide more aware of human rights violations in other parts of the 
world. Not to interfere in these conflicts because of not knowing about them, became 
nearly impossible. At this time the superpower position of the U.S. became more and 
more linked to the responsibility to intervene in such conflicts. The mass media began to 
influence public opinion and, therewith, the politics of states 
 
The most important conflicts in that time were the civil war in Somalia, the genocide in 
Rwanda and the Balkans wars. A great deal of attention was devoted to the Balkan wars, 
namely the civil war in Bosnia and later the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, which occupied the 
Clinton Administration’s foreign policy through the whole time in office. On the following 
pages of this research paper the events of the Kosovo conflict will be outlined and an 
analysis of the U.S. foreign policy approach will be given. 
 
Chapter Outline 
In the introductory part, the research questions are specified and the hypotheses were 
set up. Thereafter, the motivation behind the research and the relevance of the topic are 
explained, followed by an overview of the methods which were used to conduct this 
research paper and the theoretical framework for the analysis are presented. In the main 
part, the origins of the Kosovo conflict (Chapter 6) and the major events which led to the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo will be discussed, as well as the NATO intervention itself 
(Chapter 7). Chapter 8 is devoted to the reasons and consequences of the humanitarian 
intervention along with the concept of Responsibility to Protect. Chapter 9 deals with the 
impact of the intervention on Kosovo and the perception of U.S. foreign policy. Finally, 
the conclusions of this research paper will be presented in Chapter 10. 
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2. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
First of all, I would like to explain how my research questions evolved and further 
describe the process of formulating the hypotheses I consequently came up with. 
At the beginning of my research I intended to write about American foreign policy after 
the Cold War and to compare different approaches to handling the new era of world 
politics. As described above the U.S. faced completely new problems in their role as sole 
superpower of the world. However, after extensive reading to gain a deeper insight into 
the topic I realized that it would be wiser to concentrate on a specific U.S. administration 
as the complete discussion of this whole topic would exceed the space of a diploma 
thesis . After a few considerations on the policies of different administrations, I finally 
decided to focus on the presidency of Bill Clinton (1993-2001). 
 
The reasons for choosing the Clinton Administration are many and varied. Firstly, 
Clinton’s personal background seemed interesting, because his upbringing and 
experiences contributed to his character and further to his policies. He came from a 
small middle-class family in rural Arkansas, with an alcoholic and violent stepfather, but 
he made it to study in Georgetown, Oxford and Yale. Furthermore, an important point in 
Clinton’s biography is his support of the anti-Vietnam-war movement, which was the first 
sign of his political opinions about war. Secondly, the selection of his political advisors 
was unusual and therefore shaped his foreign policy in a particular way. In Clinton’s first 
term he took advice from Neocons of the Reagan administration, but at the same time 
announced Warren Christopher as Secretary of State, who preferred diplomacy over 
military action.3 This was either a sign of uncertainty, or a sign of evaluating all options 
closely and without bias. He was later succeeded by Madeleine Albright, who served in 
Clinton’s second term in office. She had a more determined approach concerning the 
use of military force and was more willing to intervene in conflicts when diplomacy did 
not lead to the desired goal. As shown by his advisors Clinton made some changes in 
his political orientation concerning war. Thirdly, Clinton was the first president of the 
United States elected after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He represented not only a 
new generation, but also a new era of world politics and faced completely new problems 
and a completely changed political shape of the world. After nearly 50 years of constant 
global players the whole world suddenly changed. Therefore, the tasks of his presidency 
were manifold and, in particular regarding the U.S. foreign policy strategy, a different 
approach became necessary. 
                                               
3
 Frey, Erich, Clintons Amerika: Präsident einer neuen Generation, Frankfurt/Main: Eichborn, 1993, p. 153. 
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After having decided to conduct my research about the Clinton Administration’s foreign 
policy, I had to come up with a coherent research question. However, the Clinton years 
were eventful in foreign affairs and to cover everything that occurred during his 
presidency would have certainly exceeded the scale of the work. Therefore, I had to 
figure out one major event that gives a good example of his foreign policy approach and 
consequently demonstrates the effects of the Administration’s decisions. Since my 
second fields of interest, besides Political Science, are Slavonic Studies, it was obvious 
to me to combine these two fields of interest and choose an event in that specific area. 
As a result I decided that the Kosovo conflict would pose a good case study for Clinton’s 
foreign policy, in particular because of the active entanglement, not only of the United 
States, but also of the European Union, Russia, NATO and the United Nations.  
 
Therefore, my research question includes on the one hand the U.S. foreign policy during 
the Clinton years and its effects on world politics. On the other hand, it deals with the 
multilateral attempt to prevent the collapse of the Southern Balkans because of ethnic 
rivalries and the decision of the U.S. and its allies to launch a humanitarian intervention 
to contain ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This gives the chance to show the change in 
military and political actions from nation to nation measures to fighting more delicate 
problems than terror and ethnic cleansing on foreign soil. 
 
Thus my research question is: 
In how far was the U.S. foreign policy under the Clinton Administration significant 
for the course of the Kosovo conflict? 
Sub-questions that have emerged are: 
→ What were the reasons for the U.S. to intervene in the conflict? 
→ In how far did the U.S. work together with other actors of the international community 
to solve the conflict? 
→ What was the perception of the U.S. intervention at home and abroad? 
→ Why did the U.S. launch a humanitarian intervention without permission of the UN 
Security Council? 
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Based on the research question, I set up the following hypotheses: 
i) If the reason for the Clinton Administration to intervene in the Kosovo conflict was 
mainly based on moral grounds and in particular to prevent ethnic cleansing, 
then a military intervention was justified, even though it was illegal according 
to international law. 
ii) If it is assumed that the liberal theory is best suited to explain the behavior of the 
Clinton Administration, then U.S. domestic policy influenced the acting in the 
conflict. 
iii) If the United States, along with the other permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council, UK and France, had exhausted all diplomatic 
means to convince the other permanent members, Russia and China, to 
permit military actions against Serbian forces to prevent ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo, then acting on their own authority to save lives was inevitable. 
9 
 
3. Relevance of the Topic 
First of all, I would like to explain my motivation to write about this topic and afterwards 
describe the importance of the topic for international relations. 
During my years of study my major fields of interest were International Relations and the 
Eastern European region. Therefore, it was obvious to me that a combination of these 
two fields of interest would be the ideal basis for choosing my diploma thesis topic. In the 
course of studying International Relations I took part in three study trips which had a 
decisive impact on my further studies. The first one was to New York and Washington 
D.C., where I had the chance to learn more about the work of the United Nations and the 
Bretton Woods Institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This 
study trip not only gave me a better insight into the system of international organizations 
but also influenced my further interest in the politics of the country that shaped these 
institutions more than any other country in the world. Therefore, the United States of 
America and their political relations to other nations became an important part of my 
further studies. 
 
In the following years I participated in a study trip to the European institutions, in the 
course of which the visit of the International Criminal Court of the Former Yugoslavia was 
the most interesting part for me. This consequently led to an intensive study of the 
history and the events in the Southern Balkans during the years of disintegration of 
Yugoslavia. However, the initiation to focus on Kosovo emerged after a study trip to 
Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The vestiges of the Balkan wars were still present in the 
streets of Belgrade and Sarajevo, not only because of some destroyed houses but also 
in discussions with the people. On the one hand, the Serbs showed their discontent with 
the independence of Kosovo and how the international community, especially the United 
States, treated them on this matter. On the other hand, the Bosnians and Kosovo 
Albanians openly expressed their gratitude towards the Americans, in particular Bill 
Clinton, who was in their point of view a knight in shining armor. Furthermore, the 
impressions of the visit to the cemetery in Srebrenica had an impact on the perception of 
the trip as a whole. 
 
As a result of the impressions I experienced in the course of the study trips, the desire to 
write my diploma thesis about the impact of the U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton 
years on Kosovo decisively increased. 
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However, this topic is not only interesting for me but also has a significant relevance in 
world politics. After the end of the Soviet Union and therefore, the end of the Cold War, 
the United States had to define a new foreign policy strategy, because their former 
enemy suddenly disappeared and therefore the strategic orientation of the American 
security policy had to be addressed in a different way. This shift in foreign and security 
policy of the United States mark an important point not only for international politics but 
also for American domestic politics itself. Bill Clinton, who was the first president elected 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, primarily focused his election campaign on 
domestic policies like the economy, jobs and the healthcare system. Although it is 
normal practice to give priority to domestic policies during election campaigns, the need 
for a new or at least a revised foreign policy strategy received little attention. 
 
However, during the Clinton Administration various trouble spots emerged on the 
international scene. Kosovo was one of these, but the ethnic conflict had previously been 
underestimated by the U.S. and the international community. Consequently, the actions 
taken to contain the ethnic rivalries diplomatically demonstrate the will to prevent a 
violent outbreak of the conflict. This was a relevant attempt of the international 
community to solve a conflict, which threatened to escalate, although the conflict couldn’t 
be solved by diplomatic means. The cooperation among states, in particular the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Russia, is an important fact on this 
matter. Although the U.S. and Russia had a completely different view on how to address 
the conflict after the Rambouillet Agreement had failed, Russia did not pull back from the 
international scene. The political position of the U.S was clearly towards a military 
intervention, but Russia still took part in negotiations to persuade Milošević to give in and 
therefore stop the military intervention Russia had always opposed.  
 
In this context, the United Nations played a limited role, because the crucial decision to 
launch a humanitarian military intervention against Serbia was made without the UN 
Security Council, but among the members of NATO. 
 
Therefore, this topic has a particular relevance when it comes to research in the field of 
International Relations in the past, and the projection of this research into the future. The 
question why states cooperate or do not cooperate within the framework of an 
international organization like the United Nations is often addressed in theoretical 
debates. Hence, the case of Kosovo offers a good example for further research. 
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Finally, Kosovo still bothers the international community almost thirteen years later. 
Ethnic problems were not completely solved through the military intervention, which was 
perceived by the Serbian people as violation of the sovereignty of Serbia. After the 
humanitarian intervention ended in June 1999, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was 
responsible for securing the region and the civilian administration was carried out by 
UNMIK under the authority of the United Nations. This was not an easy task, because 
although the region was theoretically demilitarized many weapons and the ethnic tension 
were still present in the region. To support the development of legal structures in Kosovo 
the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was established in 2008. 
 
Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, but their new status was only recognized by 
85 of 193 member states of the UN. Among the states refusing to accept Kosovo’s 
independence are two of the permanent member states of the UN Security Council – 
Russia and China. Furthermore, even five member states of the European Union - 
Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia – have not recognized Kosovo’s 
independence.4  
 
In the case of the European Union, Kosovo is actually an obstacle to the accession talks 
with Serbia. The integration of the states of the Southern Balkans in the European Union 
is a future goal of the European community, but the ongoing conflict between Serbia and 
Kosovo, especially Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo as an independent state, is 
threatening the Serbian membership talks with the European Union. 
 
This research paper intends to give an insight into U.S. foreign policy in the new era after 
the Cold War. It tries to demonstrate the reasons for international cooperation during this 
time on the example of the Clinton Administration. The U.S. foreign policy is a dominant 
factor in our globalized world and has a decisive impact on international relations. The 
Kosovo case study was chosen, because this conflict shows the intention of the U.S. and 
the international community to solve a conflict peacefully, but consequently led to the use 
of force without the permission of the UNSC. Furthermore, the Kosovo conflict was the 
first NATO war and therefore gives a good picture of the cooperation among its member 
states. Finally, the paper provides an overview and analysis of a conflict, whose 
development and outcome is significant for further conflict studies and for examining the 
role of the United States in such situations. 
                                               
4
 Compare: Republika e Kosovës, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: http://www.mfa-
ks.net/?page=2,33, accessed 3/1/12. 
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4. Methods 
The research paper is based on a qualitative content analysis described by Philipp 
Mayring as an approach of empirical, methodological and controlled evaluation of 
various communication material, which is evaluated according to a content analytical 
structure.5 In other words, it is an editing of gathered communication material in terms of 
a specific structure.  
Mayring determines three different variations of qualitative content analysis, which 
should be part of every reliable analysis: 
1) A summary of the material should be conducted to have a manageable size of 
the material, which makes it easier to analyze it. 
2) Parts of the text should be put in a broader perspective, which means to use 
additional material to examine the context more precisely. 
3) The most important technique of qualitative content analysis is the structuring of 
the text to find formal or content-related characteristics, so that conclusions can 
be drawn.6 
The literature for the research paper was gathered in a time period of approximately one 
year. During this time, I attended several lectures at the University of Vienna about 
American foreign policy led by Professor Gärnter and lectures concerning Kosovo led by 
Dr. Vedran Dzihic and Professor Helmut Kramer. Further, I attended the International 
Conference “Statehood, Democracy and ‘Europe’ in Kosovo – Analyses and 
Perspectives”, organized by the Renner-Institut, which took place in Vienna in June 
2010. This conference gave me the opportunity to talk to various experts on the topic, 
who supported me with further material and gave me better insight into this field of 
research during lively discussions. Furthermore, I took part in a study trip to Serbia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, organized by the Academic Forum for Foreign Affairs. In the course 
of the trip I learned a lot about Serbian and Kosovo Albanian history, the events which 
led to the escalation and the perception of the international community during this crucial 
period, which naturally differs between Serbs and Albanians.  
                                               
5
 Mayring, Philipp, ‘Qualitative Content Analysis’ in: Forum: Qualitative Social Research, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
2000. 
6
 Compare: Diekmann, Andreas, Empirische Sozialforschung. Grundlagen, Methoden, Anwendungen, 
Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rohwolt Verlag, 2005, p. 512. 
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On the one hand, the collection of primary literature contained transcripts of interviews 
and statements of President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Special 
Envoy to the Balkans Richard Holbrooke, CIA Director George Tenet and General 
Wesley Clark.  
On the other hand, I worked with the documents of the Rambouillet Agreement and UN 
Security Council Resolutions. 
 
After organizing the primary and secondary literature, the next step according to 
Mayring’s approach to qualitative content analysis, was to summarize the gathered 
material and put some parts of the text in a wider perspective if further explications were 
useful, which was particularly the case concerning the interview part. Finally, the material 
was prepared for the process of structuring and significant categories were set up to 
analyze the given text. These categories were chosen in regard to the U.S. approach to 
the multilateral decision-making process, the reasons of intervening in the conflict, and 
the perception of the intervention among the international community. 
Furthermore, a case study was selected to analyze the gathered material and prove the 
research question and hypotheses. In conclusion, the findings were presented at the end 
of the thesis. 
14 
 
5. Theoretical Background 
The theories of the research paper emerged in the course of summarizing the material 
and setting up a structure of the analysis. It soon became obvious that the foreign policy 
strategy of multilateralism describes Clinton’s foreign policy approach better than 
unilateralism. For a better understanding the main points of these two opposing 
strategies will be laid out on the following pages. Furthermore, the International Relations 
theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism, were taken into account. In the course 
of analyzing these three theories, the liberalism theory was chosen to be the one that 
best explains the acting of Clinton’s Administration. The definitions of the mentioned 
theories will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Multilateralism 
There have always been debates between American scholars and policy-makers about 
the best foreign policy strategy for a prosperous nation. The decision between 
unilateralism and multilateralism evokes lively discussion in the United States. 
At first we will take a closer look at the policy strategy of multilateralism, which contains 
five key points according to Bruce Jentleson, Professor at Duke University for Political 
Science. Firstly, International Institutionalism is almost the most important key point 
when it comes to multilateralism.7 Therefore, it is necessary to go into further detail about 
what institutionalism means: Institutionalism is based on international law and 
international organizations. The roots of this theory go back to the beginning of modern 
state systems, when the first deliberations were made to setup a structure to overcome 
the situation without rights among states and to control their rivalries with the help of 
international cooperation.8  
 
These days a more modern approach to Institutionalism can be found in the classical 
texts of Robert Keohane “After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy” (1984) and the book he had already written with Joseph S. Nye 
“Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition” (1977). In these texts, the 
scholars added two new characteristics to the theory of institutionalism, namely 
interdependence and regimes. Interdependence means that states increasingly rely on 
each other and therefore violent conflicts are less likely to emerge and, furthermore, 
                                               
7
 Compare: Jentleson, Bruce W., American Foreign Policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21
st
 century, 3
rd
 
edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p. 263-267. 
8
 Compare: Schimmelfennig, Frank, Internationale Politik, Paderborn; Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 
2.Auflage, 2010, p. 89. 
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international cooperation becomes more useful. In consequence, a framework is 
necessary to handle international cooperation – international regimes.  
 
These regimes establish a framework through which international cooperation can be 
carried out and arrangements are monitored. Finally, it leads to a better coordinated and 
more peaceful world.9 Jentleson points out that the advantage of multilateral acting is not 
only the sharing of burdens, but also that actions can only be legitimate when they are 
carried out multilaterally.10 Secondly, there is the acknowledgement that there is a 
difference between power and influence in international relations. The multilateralist 
approach emphasizes that to be a powerful country does not automatically lead to more 
influence on the acting of other countries. Therefore, the key word is “soft power”, as 
Joseph S. Nye called it. He stressed that “soft power is more than persuasion or the 
ability to move people by argument. It is the ability to entice and attract. And attraction 
often leads to acquiescence or imitation.”11 A multilateralist approach to foreign policy 
consequently means not to rely on the military might and the fear by other countries that 
this power could be used against them, but to influence them by setting a good example. 
Thirdly, the foreign policy strategy is shaped by national and global interests. Although 
even multilateralists admit that the national interest comes first, in a globalized world 
many problems cannot be addressed unilaterally. Therefore, a multilateral approach 
often not only suits the international community but also the United States.12 Fourthly, 
international institutions are necessary for a coherent multilateral action and therefore, 
should not be rejected, because some of them have structural deficits. Multilateralists 
tend to support reforms of the institutions instead of abandoning them. Fifthly, 
multilateralism has a much greater domestic political support than unilateralism, which 
can be underpinned by opinion polls showing a majority of the people in favor of, for 
example, the United Nations.13 
                                               
9
 Compare: Schimmelfennig, Frank, Internationale Politik, Paderborn; Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 
2.Auflage, 2010, p. 90. 
10
 Jentleson, Bruce W., American Foreign Policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21
st
 century, 3
rd
 edition, 
New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p. 264. 
11
 Nye, Joseph S., The Paradox of American Power: Why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 8-9. 
12
 Compare: Jentleson, Bruce W., American Foreign Policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21
st
 century, 3
rd
 
edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p. 266. 
13
 Compare: Jentleson, Bruce W., American Foreign Policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21
st
 century, 3
rd
 
edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p. 267. 
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Liberalism 
The first and most important theorist of liberalism was the philosopher Immanuel Kant. 
He wrote in his text “Perpetual Peace” (1795) about the conditions that have to exist for a 
lasting peace among states, including a “republican constitution”. According to Kant a 
liberal political and social order influences international relations in a positive way and 
therefore leads to more peace and international cooperation. Kant’s theories did not only 
shape the liberal theory, but also provided a framework for theories that emerged out of 
liberalism, in particular institutionalism, which was already mentioned above.14 
Furthermore, liberalism acknowledges the fact that the foreign policy of states is not 
consistent, because it is designed by various domestic actors with different aims. 
Therefore, the foreign policy of a state is a compromise of national politics, which we 
have to bear in mind.15 
 
To the same assumption came Andrew Moravcsik, a modern representative of liberal 
theory who, in his paper “Liberalism and international relations theory”, presented three 
key assumptions about liberal theory. Firstly, he argued that domestic actors shape the 
policies of a state to promote their own interest. These actors are mostly individuals or 
non-governmental groups, who urge their “interests under constraints imposed by 
material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence”.16 This means 
that the members of a society have a particular influence on state politics. Secondly, he 
assumed that a part of the social society is represented through the state and its 
institutions and therefore the interests of this part of society influence the state’s 
approach in international politics. Thirdly, he emphasized that the conformation of the 
different preferences within a state finally shapes the behavior of the state.17 It can be 
concluded that the liberal theory is based on the influence of societal actors in domestic 
politics, who are able to promote their interests in a way that the state’s behavior in 
regard to international politics is a reflection of its society. 
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Furthermore, the liberal theory is able to describe the changes of cooperation and 
conflict among states in international relations, as well as historical variations of the 
international system.18 Consequently, it can be said that in liberal theory the state’s 
aspiration for power in international relations is usually weaker than the desire to pursue 
economic and idealistic goals. 
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II. Main Part 
6. The Kosovo Conflict 
An inexhaustible source of national pride was discovered on [sic] Kosovo. More 
important than language and stronger than Church, this pride unites all Serbs in a single 
nation.[…]The glory of the Kosovo heroes shone like a radiant star in the dark night of 
almost five hundred years.[…]There was never a war for freedom – and when was there 
no war? – in which the spirit of Kosovo heroes did not participate. The new history of 
Serbia begins with Kosovo – a history of valiant efforts, long suffering, endless wars, and 
unquenchable glory[…].We bless Kosovo because the memory of the Kosovo heroes 
upheld us, encouraged us, taught us and guided us. 
- Čedomil Mijatović, Foreign Minister of Serbia, speech on the 500th 
anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo (“Field of the Blackbirds”), 188919 -  
-  
In the run-up to the escalation of tensions between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians in 
Kosovo in 1999, the past of the Nemanijć era, the historic places, were constantly 
recalled in Serbian public to once more illustrate the importance of the poor province in 
the south for the Serbian identity. Therefore, it is necessary to know the background of 
the tales, myths and historical tradition of the region to gain an insight into the evoked 
sentiments and reactions in this period. 
 
6.1. The origins of the conflict 
Before we can discuss the Kosovo conflict itself, we have to understand the complex 
history of the region and realize that Serbs and Kosovo Albanians have a completely 
different point of view concerning their common past. The controversy starts when it 
comes to the question “Who was in Kosovo first?”. On the one hand the Serbs claim that 
their ancestors, the Slavs, came to the region in the sixth century and spread into the 
Southern Balkans over the following centuries. They admit that Albanians may have lived 
there too, but the area was mostly settled by the Serbs, who were the descendants of 
the Slavs. On the other hand, the Albanians declare that they were in Kosovo before the 
Slavs arrived there, namely as Illyrians and Dardanians. Therefore, Kosovo Albanians 
consider Serbs as the intruders. However, this is not only a quarrel between nationalists 
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on both sides, but also between academic scholars, who cannot definitely support either 
side of this discussion.20 There is not, nor will there ever be any certain answer to the 
question “Who was in Kosovo first?”, because there hardly exist any archaeological 
sources about the ethnicities of that time.21 
 
When it comes to the Middle Ages, the picture of the region becomes somewhat clearer. 
The reign of the Nemanijć dynasty marked the beginning of the “Serbdom” and their 
monarchs shaped the history of the era between 1217 and 1371 significantly. The 
Serbian kingdom included most of the territory of present Serbia, Albania, Macedonia 
and up to the Aegean Sea and, in this respect, Kosovo was located in the middle of the 
kingdom.22 The importance of Kosovo for the kingdom arose especially due to the 
religious buildings, the churches and monasteries of the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
which were built there. The two major figures of the Nemanjić dynasty were Stefan 
Nemanja and his son Rastko. In 1196, Stefan Nemanja, who was the founder of the 
dynasty decided to become a monk and abdicated his reign. Nemanja’s third son 
Rastko, who also became a monk and is nowadays better known as St. Sava, was 
essential for the Serbian Orthodox Church. That is because he managed to obtain 
autocephaly for the Serbian Orthodox Church from the Byzantine Monarch and the 
Orthodox Patriarch in 1219, just two years after his brother became King of Serbia. 
During this time several churches and monasteries were built in Kosovo. These churches 
include the Patriarchate of Peć, Dečani and Gračanica and are meaningful places for the 
Serbian Orthodox Church.23 Obviously the Nemanjić dynasty was crucial for the first 
experience of a Serbian identity, which was not so much determined by territory, but 
principally by a national church. Having a deeper insight into the historiography of the 
Serbs concerning the ruling of Kosovo in the Middle Ages and their claim to the region, 
for example that the majority of the population of Kosovo were Serbs, the Albanian point 
of view naturally differs once again. Albanian historians agree with their Serbian 
counterparts that the names of the people living in Kosovo, according to church 
registers, were mostly of Slavic origin. However, these historians do not agree that the 
inhabitants of Kosovo ultimately were all Serbs. They state that the majority of the 
population were Albanians who were forced to have Slavic names as a sign of 
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suppression. Therefore, it seems as if Kosovo was a Serbian populated area24. It is 
conceivable that the rulers of the Serbian kingdom tried to oppress other ethnicities or 
religions to spread the “Serbdom” and the Serbian Orthodox religion throughout their 
territory. However, there exist no scientifically valid sources, which back the argument of 
the Albanian historians. Therefore, the major problem of the entire discussion is the lack 
of reliable sources. 
6.2. The Battle of Kosovo and its myths 
Stefan Dušan, the last ruler of the Nemanjić dynasty, died in 1355. After his death, the 
Serbian empire began to disintegrate and several feudal lords were trying to gain more 
control. These lords engaged in battles and - when it suited them - periodically worked 
together. The rise of the Ottoman Empire extended to the Southern Balkans, but the 
Ottomans were not keen to fight in the region. Instead, they proposed a peaceful take-
over to the feudal lords. If the lords accepted to subordinate themselves under the 
Ottoman rule, they were allowed to keep the command of their region. That meant that 
the Ottomans pursued a strategy to leave the feudal lords relatively autonomous. In 
return, the lord would provide the Ottomans troops during wartimes. For most of the lords 
this proposal seemed reasonable, but one dismissed it. He was a noble named Lazar, 
who possessed some parts in the Morava valley, including the city of Novo Brdo. Today 
it is a small town in the eastern part of Kosovo, but in former times it was an impressive 
city with about 40,000 inhabitants due to the many silver and gold mines in the area. 
Why Lazar rather decided to fight against the Ottomans instead of accepting their offer of 
a peaceful agreement is unknown. It can be assumed that Lazar was aware of the 
Ottoman strength. Nevertheless, he challenged the Ottoman Empire and deployed a 
small union of feudal lords, who agreed to go to war with the Ottoman Empire. This war 
became known as the Battle of Kosovo at Kosovo Polje, a field near the city of Priština. 
Nowadays it may be better known as “the Field of Blackbirds”.25  
 
Even though the Battle of Kosovo, which took place in June 1389, seems to be crucial 
for the Serbian identity, there barely exists historic knowledge about it. What is known is 
that both leaders - Prince Lazar on the side of the Christian coalition and Sultan Murad I 
on the side of the Ottoman Empire - died in this battle. But after this similarity in Ottoman 
and Serbian historiography, the question of “Who killed Sultan Murad I?” divided the 
historians once again. The Ottoman annalists argue that the Sultan fell victim to a 
hideous assassination carried out by assumed Christian defectors. These alleged 
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defectors credibly showed interest in Islamic religion and pretended to desire to change 
their faith, but instead they killed Sultan Murad I. The Serbian annalists submit a more 
heroic story that just one person, called Miloš Obilić, managed to stab the Sultan in his 
tent.26 Whatever might be true, the murder of the Sultan did not save the feudal lords 
from defeat. The battle caused numerous deaths on each side and after Lazar got 
captured, the Ottomans immediately executed him.27 This battle became legendary and 
was a mythmaking event for the Serbs, but the distinction between history and myth is 
ambiguous. Most of the tales may have been a kind of propaganda of the Middle Ages28. 
In literature, one can find many Serbian songs and poems about the famous battle that 
glorify Lazar’s valor although the battle was a great defeat. 
 
Normally, such a defeat does not seem a good plot for heroic songs and poems, but 
even centuries after this event poems about it are still recited by Serbs discussing 
Kosovo. It is perceived as a vital myth for their national identity. The Serbian linguist, Vuk 
Karadžić, published a collection of old folk songs and poems at the beginning of the 19th 
century. One of these heroic songs, which were only orally transmitted over the 
centuries, was: “The Downfall of the Serbian Empire”: 
Flying hawk, grey bird, 
out of the holy place, out of Jerusalem, 
holding a swallow, holding a bird, 
that is Elijah, holy one; 
holding no swallow, no bird, 
but writing from the Mother of God 
to the Emperor at Kosovo. 
He drops that writing on his knee, 
it is speaking to the Emperor: 
'Lazar, glorious Emperor, 
which is the empire of your choice? 
Is it the empire of heaven? 
Is it the empire of the earth? 
If it is the empire of the earth, 
saddle horses and tighten girth-straps, 
and, fighting men, buckle on swords, 
attack the Turks, 
and all the Turkish army shall die. 
But if the empire of heaven 
weave a church on Kosovo, 
build its foundations not with marble stones, 
build it with silk and with crimson cloth, 
take the Sacrament, marshal the men, 
they shall die, 
and you shall die among them as they die.’ 
And when the Emperor heard those words, 
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He considered and thought, 
‘King God, what shall I do, how shall I do it? 
What is the empire of my choice? 
Is it the empire of heaven? 
Is it the empire of the earth? 
And if I shall chose the empire, 
and choose the empire of the earth, 
the empire of earth is brief, 
heaven is everlasting.’ 
And the emperor chose the empire of heaven 
Above the empire of the earth.29 
 
This famous song demonstrates Lazar’s heroic decision to go to war with the Ottoman 
Empire. It was aimed to show his readiness to make sacrifices for his fellow Serbs and 
the church. If he had chosen the empire of the earth, the Turkish army would have been 
defeated, but the victory would have been short-lived. His decision to choose the empire 
of heaven immortalized Serbia and left the hope of its reawakening one day. Therefore, 
these lyrics are often remembered, when Serbs are talking about the importance of 
Kosovo. For them, it is a sacred place, where centuries ago a feudal lord paved the way 
for a Serbian state on the grounds of the “Field of Blackbirds”, which is on Kosovo soil. 
 
For this reason, many Serbs consider Kosovo not only as a central part of Serbia’s 
territory, but also an essential part of the country’s destiny till this day. It is 
incomprehensible for most people that an event that took place centuries ago lacking 
historical accuracy and lyrics of a heroic song, can be so crucial for a whole nation. 
However, this myth was built up over many years and constantly propagated in the 
Serbian society to make sure everyone understands its significance for the Serbian 
nationhood. The reason to specify the historic background of the legendary Battle of 
Kosovo is to give an understanding of how long the Serbian claim for Kosovo has existed 
and why politicians have used myths to gain the peoples’ support in their attempt to keep 
the province of Kosovo, no matter the cost. 
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6.3. Constant demographic shifts in Kosovo 
After the defeat on Kosovo Polje, Serbia and Kosovo were under the rule of the Ottoman 
Empire. In this time, many Albanians converted to Islam, because in contrast to the 
Christian Serbs, they did not belong to an organized national church. It is worth noting 
that Serbs also converted to Islam during this time, but by far not as much as their fellow 
Albanians.30 The Ottomans did not try to force their new subjects to convert to Islam, but 
used a kind of “soft power”, as we would call it today. To climb the social ladder in the 
Ottoman Empire, individuals needed to be of Muslim faith because only loyal Muslims 
were allowed to maintain high positions in the Empire. Furthermore, Christians were not 
accepted in the army and every Christian had to pay a tax per head.31 Apart from that, 
the Orthodox Christians could practice their religious traditions without problems. 
Therefore, Serbs who were not strictly religious were more likely to convert to Islam. This 
fact presumably led to a small shift in respect of religious affiliation. However, the 
demographic shift began in the year 1689, when the Austrian army advanced toward 
Kosovo to fight back the Ottomans. The Serbian historians say that many Christian 
Serbs supported the Austrians and started to revolt against the Turkish power. But 
unfortunately for the Serbs and some Christian Albanians, the Austrians overestimated 
their strength and finally had to draw back northwards. With them ten thousands of 
Serbs, fearing retaliation by the Turks, fled to the north of Serbia, which was under 
Austrian rule, and in particular started settling the Vojvodina region. As a result many 
districts in Kosovo became depopulated and the Muslim Albanians of the mountains 
were urged to settle down in these abandoned villages. But also here historians are split 
about the composition of the insurgents. While most of the Serbian history books state 
that only the Christian Orthodox inhabitants supported the Austrians, others explain that 
some Moslems also rose up against the Turks.32 It is, after all, a fact that many Serbs left 
Kosovo after the Austrian defeat and contributed to one of the first historic demographic 
shifts in Kosovo. 
 
It took more than a century until the Serbian peasants once more began to revolt against 
the Turkish foreign rule. In 1804 the Serbs initiated a significant peasant uprising, which 
after years of fighting finally led to autonomy of the Principality of Serbia in 1830 and 
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most of the Turkish units withdrew in 1867. The Serbs managed to achieve their 
independence again in 1867 when the Congress of Berlin officially recognized Serbia as 
a state.33 However, before the Congress of Berlin drew the new map of the Southern 
Balkans, the Serbs and Montenegrins were once again at war with the Ottomans (1876-
1878) to win back the southern territories. For the Serbs that meant in particular – 
Kosovo. With the recognition of the new independent states of the Balkans in 1878, the 
war with the Turks ended and Kosovo was still part of the Ottoman Empire. This 
outcome was not easy for the Serbs to accept.34 The events between 1804 and 1878 
caused further demographic changes in Kosovo and the region, because more and more 
Serbs emigrated from Kosovo to the increasing territory of Serbia, and during the war 
with the Turks about 50,000 Albanians, most of them Muslims, came to Kosovo and took 
up their new residence there.35 
 
These demographic shifts were the beginning of an increasing Albanian populated 
Kosovo, especially in the South. However, as mentioned above, for the Serbs a nation 
without Kosovo within its borders was not complete, no matter how few Serbs still lived 
there. Such a view was strengthened in the 19th century by the emerging Serbian 
nationalism. The old heroic songs were collected and published with the aid of Vuk 
Karadžić, a linguist, who also initiated a language reform and therefore contributed 
significantly to the Serbian national identity.36 After 1878 the Serbs not only had their own 
independent state and national Church, but also a common national language. 
Everything that was necessary to develop a profound nationalism, which is demonstrated 
at the beginning of the chapter by the quote of the Foreign Minister of Serbia, Čedomil 
Mijatović, in 1889! 
 
While the Serbs recovered their sovereignty and became a nation, the Albanians, still 
under Ottoman rule, ultimately realized the necessity to organize themselves. The 
League of Prizren was an attempt to bring all Albanians together, debating actions that 
would shape their future. But unlike the Serbs, Albanian nationalism was not that strong 
and they only managed to make up vague statements about the future status of Kosovo. 
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The days of the Ottoman rule of the Southern Balkans were insecure; the time between 
1878 -1912 was marked with constant uprisings, which led to a volatile situation in the 
region. The Ottoman Empire was defeated and the First Balkan War was over at the end 
of 1912. The result was devastating for the Albanians, just a month after the declaration 
of independence of the Republic of Albania, they were again under foreign rule, as 
Serbia and Montenegro divided Kosovo among themselves.37 
6.4. Kosovo: 1912-1989 
In 1915, Serbia was attacked by Austro-Hungary, Germany and Bulgaria. Many Serbs 
fled southward through Kosovo to the sea to get rescued by the French or British. But 
these Serbs needed to survive the way past Kosovo Albanians, who were mischievous 
and ready to punish their Serbian occupants for what they had done to them over the 
previous years. But the luck of the Albanians did not last long, because in 1918 the 
Serbs regained power and Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, also known as Yugoslavia.38 The following years were disastrous for Kosovo 
as the Kosovo Information Center describes: 
After the end of the First World War and the creation of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian 
Kingdom (SCSK), forceful colonisation in the Albanian land continued. On 25 February, 
1919, the government of SCSK passed the Decree ‘Preliminary Regulations on 
Settlement of Agrarian Relations' which was in effect until 1931, when ‘the Law on 
Agrarian Reform and Colonisation' was passed. This law intended the colonisation of 
Kosova, expropriation of the Albanians' ownership, ethnic cleansing, forceful emigration 
and serbianisation of the Albanian regions. Various genocidal[sic] measures were used for 
the expulsion of the Albanians. In the period between 1913-1939, ‘flying detachments' of 
military and policemen acted to punish and massacre the population. From 1918 to 1938, 
the military burned and destroyed 320 villages with Albanian population. Only between 
1918-1921, it killed 12,346 persons, put 22,160 people into prison, plundered 50,515 
houses and burned down 6,125 houses.39 
 
The expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo was prepared in detail and was carried out over 
several years without any international outcry. From the Serbian point of view, Kosovo 
belonged to the Serbian nation and was therefore supposed to be mostly settled by 
Serbs. Additionally, the Kosovo Albanians were seen as an obstacle to peace in the 
region, with regard to their desire to be an independent state or at least to be part of a 
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Greater Albania. No ethnic group forgets the punishments of the members of the 
occupying forces, which for the Kosovo Albanians were the Serbs. Understandably, the 
atmosphere between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians was tense and for this 
reason living side by side became almost unbearable. The oppression of the Albanian 
inhabitants of Kosovo of course did not make them more likely to be part of a Serbian 
nation, but resulted in a growing feeling of Albanian nationalism and secession efforts. 
The reduction of the Albanian population in Kosovo continuously proceeded over many 
years: 
While the Albanians comprised 90 per cent of the population in these regions in 1912, it 
was down to 70 per cent in 1941.40 
 
With the beginning of World War II, the tide turned once again. While fascist Italy already 
invaded Albania in 1939, the invasion of Yugoslavia by the Nazi regime did not start until 
1941. This time the consequences were more devastating for the Serbs than for the 
Albanians.41 Serbs living in Kosovo were attacked and mostly Serbian populated villages 
were looted and burned down. The figures show that until 1942 about 70,000 refugees 
from Kosovo had fled into Serbia.42 
 
It seems like a vicious circle of expulsion and murder that was carried out by Serbs and 
Albanians. During the course of the fighting, each side gained the upper hand at least 
once in a while. However, the Serbs exercised power in the region more often and for a 
longer period. Even after the end of World War II the vicious circle of violence could not 
be broken. In 1945, Serbia became a constituent republic of the Federal People’s 
Republic of Yugoslavia. Kosovo was again annexed to Serbia, but this time as an 
autonomous region.43 Josip Broz Tito, the president of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, raised the legal status of Kosovo to autonomy in 1974. As a consequence 
Albanians were officially allowed to govern the territory of Kosovo, but were still not fully 
independent from Serbia. Over the next few years the rise of national consciousness of 
Kosovo Albanians increasingly became a problem for Serbia. The Albanians were not 
satisfied with the general economic situation of the region and still longed for an 
independent Kosovo. Because of the poor economic situation in the 1980s and the 
growing “Albanization”, many Serbs left Kosovo northwards in the hope of finding work 
and a secure life. This situation and a high Albanian birth-rate resulted in a new 
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demographic shift of Kosovo.44 In 1981, about 1.6 million people lived in Kosovo, of 
whom 77.4 percent were Albanians and just 13.2 percent were Serbs. Just ten years 
later the Albanians already represented 82.2 percent of Kosovo’s population, whereas 
the Serbs only made up 9.9 percent of Kosovo’s population, which almost reached 2 
million by 1991.45 If we look at these numbers, the demographic changes in Kosovo over 
the years were remarkable due to complex reasons and circumstances. Although the 
Albanians represented the majority of Kosovo’s population, their struggle for 
independence seemed hopeless, especially after Slobodan Milošević appeared on the 
political stage and Yugoslavia was about to collapse. 
 
After Milošević was elected president of Serbia in 1989, he addressed a rally on June 
28th at Gazimestan, a monument near the actual battlefield of the Battle of Kosovo. He 
gave a famous speech on the occasion of the battle’s 600th anniversary, apparently still 
believing in the continuation of the SFRY under Serbian domination, which was 
translated by the National Technical Information Service of the US Department of 
Commerce: 
Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of 
other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am 
truly convinced that it is its advantage. National composition of almost all countries in the 
world today, particularly developed ones, has also been changing in this direction. 
Citizens of different nationalities, religions, and races have been living together more and 
more frequently and more and more successfully.(…) After all, our entire country should 
be set up on the basis of such principles. Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it 
can survive only under the conditions of full equality for all nations that live in it.46 
 
It remains unclear whether Slobodan Milošević really believed in what he said that day. 
Obviously he never intended a break-up of Yugoslavia, but an integration of independent 
states in the state of Yugoslavia. That Kosovo would not become an independent state 
soon became clear, when its autonomy was abolished in the same year.47 Milošević’s 
speech was interpreted differently in the media coverage, as the publicist Hannes 
Hofbauer points out in his book “Experiment Kosovo”. He observed that the conciliatory 
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tones of the speech were not taken into account, because the media coverage of 
Yugoslavia and Milošević already had a negative orientation. Therefore, statements 
concerning a peaceful coexistence of all nationalities in Yugoslavia had been omitted.48 
However, the disintegration process of Yugoslavia continued and led to a civil war, from 
which two independent states emerged - namely the Republic of Slovenia and the 
Republic of Croatia - while the struggle for independence in Bosnia ended in an ethnic 
conflict. 
 
This chapter describes the origins of the conflict leading to the escalations of the 1990s. 
It is crucial to have an understanding of the Albanian struggle for self-governance, which 
has taken place for centuries and caused a high number of victims among the civilian 
population. On the other hand, for the Serbs Kosovo is an important basis of the nation’s 
identity, the cradle of Serbdom, and therefore should always be a part of the nation’s 
history and territory. There are no certain statements whether the Serbs or Albanians are 
right with their claim of being the first on the territory or who made up the majority of its 
population for most of the time. Additionally, for many people these questions do not 
even matter anymore. The bloody fights of the two ethnicities left generations with so 
much hatred against each other that reconciliation is hard to reach. After the Kosovo 
Albanians finally lived with extensive autonomy during the years of Yugoslav rule, they 
were not willing to give up all their achievements once more. Consequently, the positions 
were hardened and there was no way out of a conflict, which had been building up over 
centuries. It was just a matter of time when it finally escalated. 
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7. NATO intervention in Kosovo 
We had discussed in many forums whether this would be another Vietnam - was this 
going to take a very long time. I never thought it would be over quickly, but relatively, it 
was not a long time. It was 78 days. We were dealing with somebody who is genuinely 
evil, who was committed to overrunning a group of people, and who has control over his 
country and over his military. Given that, I do think we handled this in a relatively short 
time. 
- Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, in an interview with PBS49- 
 
7.1. Background to the NATO intervention 
The loss of autonomy in 1989 enraged Kosovo Albanians and led to a structure of 
Albanian shadow institutions as part of peaceful resistance against the Serbian 
oppression. However, they learned that peaceful resistance, as for example to declare 
independence and establish a de-facto Albanian government - although not officially 
recognized - would not result in self-determination like in Slovenia or Croatia. The Serbs 
would never give up Kosovo without being forced to do so, so they had to draw the 
international attention to their situation. In the meantime the U.S. and the European 
Union were occupied with the war in Bosnia and eager to prevent a collapse of the entire 
region, therefore at first, Kosovo did not occur at the top of their list of priorities.50 Ibrahim 
Rugova, an Albanian literary scholar and poet, took the lead of Kosovo in these turbulent 
times as the chairman of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), formed in 1989. He 
was the reason why the violence in Kosovo did not get out of hand, the so called “Ghandi 
of Pristina” insisted on peaceful resistance, because otherwise Serbs would finally have 
a reason to eradicate Albanians in Kosovo.51 To run the parallel institutions, money had 
to be raised in the Albanian communities outside of Kosovo, which were somehow 
obliged to pay for their compatriots. If this always happened voluntarily is doubtful, but no 
one ever had the courage to complain about the mafia-like methods of this kind of 
Albanian mafia organization in public.52 The frustration became unbearable for the ethnic 
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Albanians in Kosovo. The years of struggle for self-determination and an independent 
state ended up in a violent environment, with the constant threat of Serbian raids on 
Albanian villages and the fear to be driven out of their homes. In return Serbian settlers 
in Kosovo could not expect to live in peace either, because Albanians saw them as their 
enemies, no matter how peace-loving some Serbs seemed. That somewhat explains the 
different view concerning the question of which ethnic group suffered more in the region. 
While the Serbs considered themselves as legal settlers on Serbian soil, even though 
they were a minority, for the Albanians they were part of the occupying forces and jointly 
responsible for their committed atrocities. Since neither of them were willing to give in, 
the events could only lead to a violent solution of the conflict. 
 
The first time Kosovo found itself in the Western spotlight was the so called “Christmas 
warning” of U.S. President George Bush in 1992. In this secret note the U.S. warned 
Milošević of further attacks against Albanians, because violations of human rights would 
force them to intervene, although the U.S. emphasized that they still recognized Kosovo 
as a legal part of Serbia. This threat was repeated several times during the following 
years, but while for Milošević  Kosovo was an internal problem, the U.S. was far more 
concentrated on solving the war in Bosnia.53 The threat of a military intervention was 
repeated for the next seven years, when in 1999 NATO started its war against Serbia. 
After the Dayton Peace Accord of 1995, the Kosovo Albanians were once more 
disappointed by the international community, because even the Bosnian Serbs were not 
allowed to create an independent state and the Western countries did not dare to 
question the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Therefore, Kosovo’s independence 
seemed further away than previously expected. In this atmosphere the non-violent 
resistance of Rugova’s LDK started crumbling and an extremist group of young Kosovo 
Albanian men ready to fight for Kosovo’s independence at whatever cost, emerged. The 
Kosovo Liberation Army, also known under its Albanian name Ushtria Çlirimtare e 
Kosovës or UÇK, took the opportunity of the breakdown of the Albanian state and 
smuggled a large amount of weapons across the border into Kosovo. With their new 
equipment the KLA were not only able to launch small bloody attacks against the 
Serbian police forces, but they also brought several areas under their control and 
massacred Serbian civilians. The counter-attack of the Serbian forces was not long in 
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coming. The spiral of violence escalated and the KLA achieved what they wanted – to be 
high on the international agenda.54 
 
In an interview with the U.S. television network PBS Richard Holbrooke, chief negotiator 
of the Dayton Agreement, later explained his position on the Kosovo conflict: 
My advice and position on Kosovo, from the beginning of my involvement in the spring of 
1998 on, was basically that the Serbs and the Albanians would never be able to settle 
their problems unless there was an outside international security presence on the ground. 
The hatred between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo was far, far greater than any of the 
so-called ethnic hatreds of Bosnia, which had been grossly exaggerated by the crooks, 
and the mafioso demagogues in the ethnic communities of Bosnia.55 
 
Richard Holbrooke mentioned in this interview the widespread opinion of the necessity of 
ground forces in Kosovo to prevent further acts of violence. For most of the observers of 
the conflict it was obvious that the spiral of violence and counter-violence would not be 
able to be stopped by the signing of a peace agreement. To bring a halt to ethnic 
cleansing and displacement, impartial international observers were substantial to assure 
compliance on both sides. 
 
At first the Clinton administration did not seem keen to intervene in this conflict militarily, 
but the growing human rights violations made Kosovo impossible to ignore. In 1998 
Clinton sent the chief negotiator of the Dayton Agreement and experienced U.S. 
diplomat Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade. He negotiated an agreement with Milošević, 
which included the withdrawal of the Serbian police forces from Kosovo and the 
acceptance of about 2,000 international observers in Kosovo. The final agreement on the 
Kosovo Verification Mission was signed by the OSCE Chairman in Office and the 
Foreign Minister of the Republic of Yugoslavia in October 1998, and deployed until 
February 1999 a maximum of 1,500 unarmed observers, who should monitor compliance 
with the agreement and work together with the authorities of the Federal Republic 
Yugoslavia (FRY).56 The cease-fire did not even last over the winter months. In a 
statement of the CIA Director George J. Tenet on current and projected security threats 
for 1999, he already predicted a negative development in Kosovo: 
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Kosovo is the most acute problem. The Kosovo Liberation Army will emerge from the 
winter better trained, better equipped, and better led than last year. With neither Belgrade 
nor the Kosovar Albanians willing to compromise at this point, spring will bring harder 
fighting and heavier casualties, unless the International Community succeeds in imposing 
a political settlement. The fragility of any political solution is likely to generate pressure for 
the International Community to deploy ground forces to enforce implementation and deter 
new fighting.57 
 
Tenet proved to be right. While the Serbs according to the Holbrooke-Milošević 
Agreement had withdrawn a great amount of their forces from Kosovo, the KLA saw its 
chance to fill the gap and therefore provoked Serbian action. The massacre of Račak, in 
January 1999, committed by Serbian forces, reminded the U.S. of the massacre in 
Srebrenica four years ago and was a turning point in the perception of the conflict. 
However, neither the advisors of the Clinton Administration nor the Congress in 
Washington nor the public liked to hear George Tenets assumption that whatever 
political solution of the conflict would be chosen, ground forces would be inevitable to 
observe the compliance of such a settlement.  
 
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also tried to convince the other members of 
the Clinton Administration that a reliable threat of force was important to demonstrate 
power to Milošević and that there was no way to avoid ground troops if an agreement 
was reached.58 She pointed out that the disapproval of peacekeeping forces under U.S. 
officials originated from four major concerns. First, ‘they didn’t want to have to support a 
second major long-term mission in the Balkans’; second, ‘they worried about getting 
caught in the middle of civil war.’ Third, ‘they doubted our ability to rouse public support 
for the obscure cause of Kosovar autonomy ’ and fourth, ‘they wondered whether 
Congress would come up with our share of peacekeeping costs’.59 These were practical 
considerations of Clinton’s policy advisors, who first and foremost had to bear in mind 
the consequences for the United States. 
 
However, a final attempt was made to bring the conflict to a peaceful end in the hope to 
at least avoid a military intervention – the talks at the chateau of Rambouillet in 1999. 
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7.2. Rambouillet Talks 
On February 6th 1999 the negotiations for a final peace agreement took place in France 
to give Milošević one more chance to avoid a military intervention. Representatives of 
the U.S., the EU and Russia presented a proposal to the Serbian and Albanian 
negotiators which should be accepted in the main parts by both parties and 
disagreements on minor parts could be reargued if necessary. The three chief 
negotiators of the Rambouillet Agreement were Ambassador Christopher Hill 
representing the U.S., Wolfgang Petritsch as Special Envoy of the European Union and 
Russian Ambassador Boris Mayorsky. In the following two weeks they discussed the 
“Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo” with the Albanian and 
Serbian delegations to reach an agreement to end the conflict in Kosovo. The key 
demands of the Peace Agreement were the following: 
 
-  An immediate cease-fire 
- Withdrawal of Serbian troops and paramilitary forces from Kosovo 
- Safe return of displaced people to their homes 
- An extensive autonomy of Kosovo (e.g. free and fair elections supervised by 
the OSCE) 
- Demilitarization of the KLA 
- Acceptance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY 
- Deployment of NATO-led peacekeeping forces 60 
The Rambouillet talks, lasting till February 23rd, can be summarized as a conference with 
intensive and dogged negotiations, interrupted by recurring setbacks. After two weeks 
and already several extensions of the conference, the demands listed above were finally 
accepted by the Kosovo Albanian delegation, although two points were highly 
controversial -  the demilitarization of the KLA and the acceptance of the territorial 
integrity of the FRY. This meant no independent state of Kosovo, which had been a 
constant claim of the KLA and a major reason of the entire fighting over the years. 
Madeleine Albright, who became more and more impatient, took an active part in the 
talks and indicated decisively what a rejection of the agreement would mean for Kosovo: 
‘Reject it, and the outcome will be a war you will lose, along with international support.’61 
At first the Albanian delegation hesitated, especially because the head of the delegation 
Hashim Thaҫi was also the leader of the political part of the KLA, but they had taken the 
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U.S. threat seriously and concluded that an extensive autonomy monitored and 
protected by peacekeeping forces would be the wiser option at that moment. 
 
In contrast, the negotiations with the Serbian delegation were far more frustrating, 
because they seemed to pursue a strategy of playing for time.62 The evaluations and 
statements concerning the civil parts of the agreement took them a long time and after 
that, they had withdrawn concessions which had already been made and the discussions 
started again.63 For the Serbian delegation the main problem seemed to be the NATO-
led peacekeeping forces on the territory of the FRY. Milan Milutinović, the president of 
Serbia, explained to Madeleine Albright that ‘we have accepted the idea of autonomy 
and democracy, but we are stuck on your proposal to insert an outside military force.’64 
Several attempts to persuade the Serbian side that a military presence would be 
necessary for the implementation of the Interim Agreement and therefore was not 
negotiable, failed.  
 
In the end, the results of the Rambouillet peace talks at least conducted a positive 
development and therefore, after a two weeks break to give both delegations time to 
consult their people at home, further negotiations continued in Paris. There the 
finalization of the Interim Agreement was expected. 
 
The negotiations in Paris started on March 15th and on the first day it was already clear 
that the Serbian delegation was not about to change its mind concerning the military 
presence on its territory. Once again several attempts were made to intensify the 
pressure on Serbia, but while the Albanian delegation signed the Interim Agreement on 
March 18th, the Serbs rallied troops near the Kosovo-Macedonian border. As a result 
floods of refugees from Kosovo were witnessed.65 At this time most of the involved 
diplomats realized the hopeless situation. At home the U.S finally succeeded in gaining 
support from the House of Representatives to provide American soldiers for 
peacekeeping forces if the agreement was signed, although many representatives still 
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expressed their reservations about ground forces.66 If Milošević at this point was still 
thinking that the U.S. was just making empty threats, he played with high risk. 
 
In mid-March 1999 President Bill Clinton sent Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade for last 
face to face negotiations with Slobodan Milošević. Holbrooke should have threatened 
him once again with NATO intervention if he had further refused to accept the Peace 
Agreement and to withdraw his troops from Kosovo, but there was no reasonable chance 
to change his mind. On March 23 1999 Holbrooke left Belgrade empty-handed and on 
the same day the U.S. Senate gave President Clinton the permission to take an active 
part in NATO bombings.67 Consequently, Bill Clinton had no other option than to support 
NATO airstrikes, because otherwise the U.S. would have lost its credibility after 
threatening Serbia with bombings for several months and the fear of witnessing another 
genocide like in Rwanda was a decisive argument as well. 
 
7.3. NATO’s first war 
On March 24th, 1999, President Bill Clinton made the case for NATO intervention in 
Kosovo, in a Statement on Kosovo, when he appeared on U.S. television to announce 
the start of NATO airstrikes against Serbia. The most important factor for Clinton was to 
point out in his speech why intervening in the southern province of Serbia was in the 
national interest of the United States, why it was a vital question for the public and why it 
was necessary to gain their support for airstrikes. He stated that the conflict in Kosovo 
could endanger the whole region, because the masses of refugees would overburden 
the neighboring states and their recently established democracies. This would shake all 
the efforts made in Bosnia and a new war on European soil could be the result. Bill 
Clinton recalled that if the U.S. had entered World War II earlier to stop Nazi Germany, 
the losses of U.S. soldiers and the economic costs would have been much lower. 
Therefore he tried to explain to the American people that to intervene now would mean a 
lower risk for U.S. soldiers to be killed and the war would be over after a short time of 
bombing. He emphasized the broad consensus between the U.S. and its NATO allies 
about the necessary measures to stop ethnic cleansing and to prove the seriousness of 
NATO to the Serbian dictator.68 Bill Clinton had to convince the American people that a 
NATO intervention, which would be carried out mostly by American soldiers, was 
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absolutely necessary and there was no other option to solve this problem diplomatically. 
Otherwise, the willingness to send American soldiers to Kosovo, a province of a 
sovereign state somewhere in southern Europe, would have been very limited. The 
support of the American public was a difficult venture, particularly when even the 
enthusiasm of the Pentagon and foreign policy scholars was hard to obtain. 
 
The airstrikes, called Operation Allied Force, started in the evening of March 24th, shortly 
after President Clinton finished his speech about Kosovo. General Wesley Clark, 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, was the American commander of the 
intervention and held responsible for the outcome. After the first days of bombing, the 
U.S. and its allies realized that Milošević was far away from giving in. In contrast, he 
intensified his efforts to drive Albanians forcefully out of their homes and burned down 
village after village. Ethnic cleansing and a refugee catastrophe should have been 
avoided by NATO intervention, but instead the situation became worse since the NATO 
airstrikes had started. Madeleine Albright had initially stated that the airstrikes would not 
take a long time and that Milošević would give in, but very soon she had to regret her 
statements and admit that the Administration and NATO underestimated the Serbian 
resistance.69 
 
General Wesley Clark had a tough job during this time. Phase I of the airstrikes did not 
impress Milošević at all, but an expansion of the target list had to be discussed and 
confirmed by U.S. officials and NATO allies, which took a certain amount of time. The 
deployment of ground forces, as demanded by General Clark several times to effectively 
stop or at least contain ethnic cleansing, were rejected, because of the high risk of 
American casualties.70 The Phase I targets only included the Integrated Air Defense 
System of Serbia, which was important to destroy regarding the safety of NATO pilots. 
However, to destroy Phase I targets were not able to prevent Serbian atrocities on the 
ground and most of this targets already were hit, so General Clark once more affirmed 
the importance to start with Phase II.71 
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A few days after the beginning of NATO’s first war, Phase I already ended and Clark 
could start to bomb Phase II targets as NATO announced on March 27th. NATO 
spokesman, Jamie Shea, and other NATO officials explained to CNN that the targets of 
Phase II mostly contained visible targets like tanks and Serbian troops in the field, in 
order to protect Albanians from further attacks by Serbian forces. But for a better target 
acquisition the pilots in Phase II had to fly lower and with less speed, which put them in 
higher danger. However, the Clinton Administration emphasized that Phase II was not a 
reaction of the unexpected ethnic cleansings, but was already part of the operation plan 
in the forefront and they continued to refuse the deployment of ground forces.72 For the 
U.S and its European Allies the most important premise was to demonstrate unity 
concerning the intervention’s execution, at least in front of the public. Milošević should be 
assured that there was no chance to use his strategy of playing for time to discourage 
NATO and therefore stop the bombings. However, the constant rejection of the Clinton 
Administration to think of a deployment of ground forces, against the advice of General 
Clark and Madeleine Albright, may have given Milošević a ray of hope. It was not a wise 
decision of Bill Clinton to take the option of ground forces off the table, even before 
NATO intervention started and without knowing how the war would develop. The reason 
for his cautious behavior was the fear of losing the support of the American people for 
the war. His defense officials also had another reason to withhold a large number of 
ground troops - they still pursued the strategy that the U.S. had to be able to fight two 
wars at the same time in different regions, as they stated to General Clark during a 
meeting. Therefore they could not provide more troops in the Balkans, even if this would 
mean to lose the war in Kosovo.73 Recognizing that Washington expected victory in 
Kosovo only through NATO airstrikes, Phase III had to be launched after four weeks of 
bombings. 
 
The results of Phase II were not good, because Milošević was smart enough to disguise 
the Serbian command centers and therefore made it difficult for NATO pilots to locate 
them. Another big problem posed the weather conditions in the area, because of thick 
clouds the visibility was poor and the selected targets could not be bombed.74 For the 
above reasons, the war did not work out as NATO had expected and after four weeks of 
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airstrikes no considerable efforts were achieved to stop Milošević of attacking Albanian 
villages and accepting the Peace Agreement. NATO, therefore, had to intensify its 
attacks and decided at the NATO summit, at the end of April, to extend the possible 
targets for the airstrikes. 
 
Phase III put the war to another level, because most of the targets were located in 
central and northern Serbia, especially in Serbia’s capital. General Clark had to work 
hard to get the approval to bomb police headquarters in highly populated areas of 
Belgrade, but in his opinion it was necessary to interrupt the command to the Serbian 
ground forces in Kosovo.75 NATO bombed not only military targets, but also 
infrastructure which was assumed necessary to uphold Serbian resistance, like transport 
routes to Kosovo, important bridges, television stations and electricity supply. The 
consequences for Serbia’s civilian population became severe, because of two reasons. 
First, the roads, bridges and electricity supply NATO had hit were not only necessary for 
the military, but even more so for the people living in the area. Water, power and 
telecommunication services broke down in some parts of the country. Second, there 
were no guarantees that the missiles only hit the chosen targets, in particular when the 
area was highly populated. Therefore, even schools, hospitals and embassies were not 
safe. The most well-known incident was certainly the accidental bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade, because NATO had used an old map.76 As a result the political 
relations between the U.S. and China deteriorated dramatically and the relations to 
Russia had already been tense long before.. 
 
This was a crucial moment for the NATO intervention, because the international attention 
moved from Serbian atrocities to the mistakes of NATO airstrikes and killings of innocent 
people. But the U.S. and its NATO allies still demonstrated unity and the willingness to 
stay there till Milošević surrendered. At that time, Russia realized that it would be better 
to work together with U.S. and European diplomats to find a solution to end the war and 
encourage Milošević to accept such an agreement. After intensive talks Martti Ahtisaari, 
UN negotiator and Russia’s special envoy to the Balkans Victor Chernomyrdin finally 
consented to a 10 points agreement, which they proposed to Milošević on June 2, 1999: 
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- An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; 
- Withdrawal of all forces from Kosovo; 
- Deployment of effective international civil and security presences in Kosovo under 
United Nations auspices; 
- International security presence with substantial NATO participation under unified 
command; 
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo; 
- Only an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel would be permitted 
to return to perform limited functions; 
- Safe and free return of all refugees; 
- Establish an interim political framework agreement according to the Rambouillet 
accords; 
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the 
crisis region; 
- Suspension of military activity required acceptance of the points made above.77 
Milošević was told that he had to accept the document without any revisions, otherwise 
the bombings would continue. Even the Russians supported the document and he 
realized that he was on his own now. At last he tiredly gave up and agreed to the deal on 
June 3rd,1999, 1999.78  
After 78 days of bombings NATO finally reached its goal. NATO’s first war lasted longer 
than expected and left a trail of destruction in Serbia. Nevertheless, for the Clinton 
Administration it was a hard-earned victory and reestablished their credibility in the 
world. They announced the message, that if anyone dared to threaten U.S. national 
interests or its ideas on morality and human rights anywhere in the world, the U.S. would 
not hesitate to take action to defend its values. Bill Clinton was hailed as the saver of 
Kosovo, not only by Kosovo Albanians themselves, but also by most of the international 
media. After his extra-marital affair with a young White House intern a year earlier, which 
became known as the “Lewinsky Scandal”, Clinton needed and was thankful for the 
admiration abroad. He was at the end of his second term in office and the victory over a 
cruel dictator certainly improved the perception of his presidency. 
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8. Humanitarian intervention 
It is almost ten years to the day that I stood in this city and gave an address at the height 
of the Kosovo crisis. In that speech, I set out what I described as a doctrine of 
international community that sought to justify intervention, including if necessary military 
intervention, not only when a nation's interests are directly engaged; but also where 
there exists a humanitarian crisis or gross oppression of a civilian population. 
 
- Tony Blair, speech to Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 23.4.2009.79- 
 
8.1. Clinton and Blair – the world’s police 
After NATO’s intervention in Kosovo came to a victorious end, critical observers started 
the discussion whether the airstrikes were necessary to stop Milošević and far more 
important, whether U.S. and its European allies, particularly Great Britain, overextended 
their commitment to stop a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. NATO’s military intervention 
set an exceptional precedent in international law, because the alliance went to war 
without permission of the UN Security Council.80 Many lawyers stated that the 
intervention, even if it was carried out on humanitarian grounds, was illegal according to 
international law. A German judge, member of the International Association of Lawyers 
Against Nuclear Arms, emphasized in an article that the use of military force against a 
sovereign state carried out by another state or an association of states (like NATO) 
violates the prohibition of violence. Therefore, no matter what the force against a 
sovereign state is called, it is illegal 81 according to the UN Charter: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.82 
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However, not only lawyers and foreign policy scholars stated their point of view on 
NATO’s first war, but also famous political figures of states, which were not involved in 
the conflict, started talking about their opinion on the new era of humanitarian 
intervention. One of these politicians was the Noble Peace Prize laureate Nelson 
Mandela, who was President of South Africa at that time, and expressed his concerns 
about American and British foreign policies in an interview with The Guardian in April 
2000: 
But I am resentful about the type of thing that America and Britain are doing. They want 
now to be the policemen of the world and I'm sorry that Britain has joined the US in this 
regard. It's a totally wrong attitude. They must persuade those countries like China or 
Russia who threaten to veto their decisions at the UN. They must sit down and talk to 
them. They can't just ignore them and start their own actions.83 
In this interview Mandela referred to a major problem concerning the whole discussion 
about the intervention in Kosovo. The U.S. and its allies went to war without permission 
of the Security Council, because the permanent members China and Russia were not 
convinced that there was no other option than military force to end the conflict in Kosovo. 
Russia, in particular, made every effort to establish a Peace Agreement that suited 
everyone, while respecting the sovereignty of Serbia’s territory. Therefore, the growing 
tensions between the U.S. and Russia after NATO launched its airstrikes were 
foreseeable and consciously taken into account by the Clinton Administration. China’s 
opinion on the topic was also ignored and after NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade the country’s relationship with the U.S. became more than tense. Even though 
the bombing of the embassy was an accident, there remained a bad taste and the feeling 
that the U.S. dedicated the intervention to one main objective – to sustain its primacy in 
world politics with the help of its loyal ally, Great Britain. 
 
The British journalist Robert Fisk reported in 1999 for The Independent about NATO’s 
humanitarian war. He was one of the first who saw the destruction of civilian targets 
caused by NATO bombings and reported about the toll of Serbian deaths. Further, he 
remarked that NATO, after it started to bomb its Phase III targets, stopped excusing for 
killing civilians. The reason was that civilian deaths grew in Phase III, because NATO 
now targeted trains, bridges and telecommunication centers and if they assumed 
soldiers were hiding in a hospital, NATO also launched airstrikes against a completely 
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civilian target.84 The descriptions of Fisk’s report point out the shift from attacking military 
targets, which were not as effective as NATO officials had hoped, to semi-civilian targets 
in populated areas. However, General Clark emphasized that every single target had to 
be approved by Washington and British lawyers and additionally NATO officials double-
checked the targets before dropping a bomb.85 
 
Robert Fisk makes an interesting point in his article, which shows the reality of the 
humanitarian intervention: 
After walking through the rubble of the Serb studios at the time, I reflected that when you 
kill people for what they say -- however much you hate their words -- then you have 
changed the rules of war. And that is what Nato did from April through to June of 1999. 
They changed the rules of war. A military barracks was a legitimate target. Then a 
tobacco factory, a road bridge, the railway line at Gurdulice -- just when a train was 
crossing the bridge.86 
The problem was that NATO fought a war they called “humanitarian”, but only based on 
air strikes. That the casualties of innocent people would be higher if NATO had to rely on 
the precision of their missiles, instead of tracking Serbian forces on the ground, was 
presumably taken into account by the Clinton Administration. Even though they tried to 
check every target in advance, it was not possible to prevent collateral damage on the 
ground in an aerial warfare.  
 
Michael O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, wrote an article after the 
end of NATO’s first war and described how a humanitarian intervention should be carried 
out in the future. In his opinion there are three questions, which have to be discussed by 
American policymakers before engaging in a humanitarian intervention: 
1) When and where should we intervene? 
There are many conflicts around the world, but the U.S. can not engage in every 
conflict. Therefore O’Hanlon suggests some guidelines of conditions that have to be 
met to intervene in a conflict: 
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 Already a high scale of deaths 
 No great-power conflicts should be created 
 Low costs for soldiers 
 It should not cost more lives than could possibly be saved 
 Practical considerations – to have a realistic chance of success 
 
2) How should we do so? 
After the decision to intervene in a conflict has been made, the real work is only just 
beginning. Therefore, a few points have to be discussed in the forefront: 
 Consider an exit strategy 
 The mission is to save lives with the least means 
 If necessary side with one party, which is the better choice for the country 
 Avoid conflicts with large insurgencies in areas where guerrilla-like warfare is 
likely 
 
3) Who should do the intervening? 
O’Hanlon maintains that the U.S. should not do the job alone, because to prevent 
human rights violations should be in the interest of every country. The problem is that 
most of the western countries are not able to share the burden, because of their fewer 
military resources. However, the U.S. should encourage other countries to make their 
military more effective for humanitarian interventions in other parts of the world and in 
the meantime peacekeeping missions can be carried out by western countries. 87 
 
It is interesting that he completely ignores the discussion whether humanitarian 
interventions, when not permitted by a Security Council Resolution, are violating 
international law. Therefore, it is unclear whether he supports interventions in internal 
affairs of other sovereign countries whenever the U.S., and most of its allies, consider it 
appropriate. O’Hanlon’s suggestions for successful humanitarian interventions revolve 
around American interests. It is desirable, of course, to intervene because of moral 
principles, but not at any price. His suggestions are based not only on realistic, but far 
more on national considerations. That means that a humanitarian intervention has to 
make sense in economic and political terms. 
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In his article he states that he considers that the Clinton Administration’s choice to 
intervene in the Kosovo conflict was a “wise decision”, but that an outline of how the 
intervention should take place and what its specific goal will be should already be 
outlined at the beginning or it could backfire.88 He refers to Clinton’s decisions to rule out 
ground forces when the intervention had not even started and to proclaim that Milošević 
had to agree to all statements in the Peace Accord. Most of the military work was carried 
out by the U.S. and Great Britain, whereas in the meantime mostly European soldiers 
were contributing to the peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. As stated in Robert 
Kagan’s book “Of Paradise and Power”, the U.S. were “making the dinner” and the 
Europeans were “doing the dishes”.89 
 
8.2. American national interests 
Before the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo started, Bill Clinton proclaimed in his 
Statement on Kosovo that this action was in the national interest of the United States.90 
The phrase “it is in our national interest” appears frequently in U.S. foreign policy and 
there does not seem to exist a precise definition of it. In the reader “American Foreign 
Policy”, written by Professor Bruce Jentleson, we find an overview of the four key points 
of the American national interest. He calls it the “4 Ps framework” - Power, Peace, 
Prosperity and Principles.91 
 Power 
It is a central part in foreign policy and consequently not only essential for 
defending itself, but also “for deterring aggression and influencing other states on 
a range of issues”.92 The famous scholar of international relations policy, Hans 
Morgenthau, concluded that “international relations is a struggle for power”.93 
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 Peace 
In his opinion all the other Ps in the framework have just one goal, namely peace. 
While power has to ensure peace, prosperity has to promote peace, and the 
principles have to strengthen it. However, the theoretical key part is International 
Institutionalism, which should demonstrate that working together in international 
institutions can contribute to the national interest, because it makes it easier to 
preserve and promote peace. 
 
 
 Prosperity 
The most important factor for prosperity is economic strength. Therefore, it is in 
the national interest to have a sustainable trade policy, which means to foster 
trade agreements or work closely together with countries that support the U.S. 
with vital resources like oil. 
 
 Principles 
The U.S. is proud of being founded on principles they can stand up for. However, 
they would also like to promote these principles throughout the world. These 
fundamental principles are the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness for 
everyone.94 Especially because the U.S. often emphasizes its strong commitment 
to the beliefs and ideals written in the Declaration of Independence, other 
countries criticize the U.S. when it does not follow the proclaimed ideals itself. 
Professor Jentleson describes with this framework the most important issues for 
Americans when it comes to their national interest. When Clinton stated that Kosovo was 
in the national interest of the United States, he presumably had in mind subjects related 
to the ”4Ps”. This means that U.S. and NATO’s credibility was at stake, which would 
have undermined American power. Further, the escalation of the conflict threatened to 
destabilize the entire region which would have posed great danger to peace. 
Furthermore, the Kosovo Albanian people were suffering and faced ethnic cleansing. 
The risk to witness another genocide like in Rwanda would have undermined the 
credibility of the U.S. in respect of holding up their moral principles and promoting them 
throughout the world. Relating to prosperity, it has to be said that the U.S. already 
invested a lot of money and soldiers in the peace of Bosnia, which would have been for 
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nothing if the region collapsed once again. It can be assumed that all of this played a role 
in deciding to intervene in the conflict. However, not every reason mentioned above 
would have had the same importance. 
 
In this regard Professor Jentleson concludes that principles and power considerations 
were the most important factors for the decision to go to war: 
As for Principles, it is hard to think of a more compelling purpose than prevention of 
genocide. In Kosovo, where the United States led the NATO intervention in 1999, 
Principles and Power were largely complementary. The intervention was intended both to 
stop ethnic “cleansing” and to ensure stability in Europe (a vital region) and the credibility 
of NATO (a vital alliance).95 
 
When we recall Bill Clinton’s statement on Kosovo and put it into context with the 
conclusion of Professor Jentleson, President Clinton told the truth to the American 
people about the reasons to go to war. Although his emphasis laid on the “moral 
imperative”, he also mentioned the national interest in his speech several times.96 With 
regard to liberal theory domestic actors influence the state’s foreign policy, therefore 
Clinton was well-advised to persuade the American people to support the intervention. 
 
8.3. Responsibility to Protect 
The end of the 20th century was marked by ethnic conflicts, civil wars and genocide. After 
all, the international community failed to address these hideous crimes. Even though in 
the 20th century functioning democracies and international organizations emerged, it was 
not enough to prevent or at least contain crimes against humanity. The most appalling 
incident in this respect was the genocide in Rwanda, where within a short space of time 
about 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in 1994.97 The following year the 
Srebrenica massacre took place during the war in Bosnia. This time about 8,000 
Bosnians, mostly Muslim men and boys, were killed by members of the Army of 
Republika Srpska. The international community could not prevent the mass killings in 
Bosnia and therefore, did not learn its lesson from the genocide in Rwanda. However, 
four years later, in the case of Kosovo NATO intervened to stop ethnic cleansing, but 
without the permission of the UNSC. In consequence, discussions followed about 
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NATO’s right to intervene in the conflict, concerning the violation of Serbia’s state 
sovereignty and if the argument to prevent ethnic cleansing alone could legitimatize a 
humanitarian intervention. 
 
At the end of NATO’s war against Serbia, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan wrote in an 
article about his perception of the past events and what had to be done in the future. He 
stressed that we were finally living in world with a new appreciation of individual rights 
and therefore, the state sovereignty had to be redefined when it came to violations of a 
state against the human rights of its people. Furthermore, the events of the past years in 
Rwanda and Kosovo showed two things that needed to be borne in mind: 
Just as we have learnt that the world cannot stand aside when gross and systematic 
violations of human rights are taking place, we have also learnt that, if it is to enjoy the 
sustained support of the world’s peoples, intervention must be based on legitimate and 
universal principles. We need to adapt our international system better to a world with new 
actors, new responsibilities, and new possibilities for peace and progress.98 
 
The need for a better coordination among the states became obvious during the events 
in the 1990s. While in Rwanda the international community was unified in condemning 
the occurring genocide but did nothing to prevent it, in Kosovo the Security Council’s 
disagreement on a military intervention led to an unauthorized action of a part of the 
international community to prevent ethnic cleansing. As Kofi Annan points out, both 
conflicts were addressed in a wrong way and therefore, a new concept of acting in such 
cases was necessary for the future. 
 
In the context of the events in Rwanda and Kosovo Annan raised two important 
questions concerning humanitarian interventions: 
It has cast in stark relief the dilemma of so-called “humanitarian intervention”. On the one 
hand, is it legitimate for a regional organization to use force without a UN mandate? On 
the other, is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with 
grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked? The inability of the international 
community to reconcile these two compelling interests in the case of Kosovo can be 
viewed only as a tragedy.99 
 
These two questions highlight the great dilemma of the international community in regard 
to humanitarian interventions. What should be done when people are suffering and 
genocide is expected, but the international community, in particular the five permanent 
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members of the UNSC, cannot agree to intervene? The problem is evident, but difficult to 
solve. If the international community put aside their state of affairs to concentrate on the 
common good and to commit itself to common actions, the mass killings of the 1990s 
could have been prevented or at least contained. The fact that democracies are working 
together in international organizations does not mean that they always have the same 
opinion and interests and therefore, common actions of the international community are 
not easy to achieve. 
 
Finally, Kofi Annan emphasized four points concerning humanitarian intervention which 
should be considered carefully. He hoped that these points could lead to further 
discussions about a framework or some kind of guideline in respect to the realization of 
humanitarian interventions. Firstly, many conflicts could have been prevented before 
they escalated into violent confrontations. An intervention does not always mean to use 
military force, sometimes other measures can constrain the ability or even the 
willingness of criminal states to punish its people. Furthermore, the international 
community has to apply the principles of human rights not only in regions, where they 
have a vital interest. Everyone has the same rights, no matter where they live. Secondly, 
with regard to the vital interest of states in a specific region, Annan points out that just as 
the foreign policy of the states changed after the end of the Cold War, the national 
interest also has to be redefined. This means in his words that “the collective interest is 
the national interest”. Thirdly, the UNSC should pose the legal basis for forceful 
interventions. However, the members of the UNSC have to act unified, otherwise 
criminal states could see its chance to commit crimes against their own people without 
getting punished. If the international community, especially the UNSC, is not able to form 
a unity against such states, it will lose its credibility as a defender of human rights. 
Fourthly, in case a ceasefire is achieved the work is not over for the international 
community - it just begins. A lasting peace is hard work and to establish it after a 
humanitarian intervention, the fundament has to be a commitment to deploy 
peacekeeping forces. 100 
 
According to the considerations of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan the Canadian 
government commissioned a project that should propose possibilities to handle violent 
conflicts in a different way and especially within the United Nations as a crucial part of 
the international system. Therefore, the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established in September 2000. A year later the 
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Commission published a report with the title “The Responsibility to Protect”. Furthermore, 
the standard of “responsibility to protect” was later adopted at the UN World Summit 
2005 in the Final Document. However, some parts of the original report were softened.101 
In the following paragraphs the main factors of the report will be described. 
 
At the beginning the Commission emphasized that this report did not intend to give big 
powers the right to abuse the sovereign rights of small countries, but to provide a 
framework, which sets up rules in case people suffer human rights violations and their 
own country is not able or willing to protect them. In such a case the international 
community has the responsibility to protect them. With respect to the debate about 
sovereignty, the report prepared a new definition of it, whereby sovereignty does not only 
mean to have control over a country, but also leads to responsibility towards its people. 
However, it should be in the interest of the international community not to let things get 
so far that an intervention is the only measure to protect people’s lives. Therefore, the 
basis for R2P is the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the 
responsibility to rebuild.102 
 
An important point in the concept of R2P is timely attention to the emerging violent 
conflict. There are four measures that could be taken in the course of the “responsibility 
to protect”, after the causes of the conflict were examined carefully. Firstly, political 
measures like offering non-official dialogues, political and diplomatic sanctions or the 
suspension of the membership in international organizations. That means that the state 
is put in the dock because of its behavior. Secondly, economic measures could be taken 
into account like trade and financial sanctions, as well as withdrawal of investment. 
Thirdly, legal measures are possible, such as offering a monitoring mission or providing 
ICC trials. Fourthly, if it is necessary, military measures should be considered like 
consensual preventive deployment or in serious cases the threat to use force. However, 
all these measures demand a political will, not only on the international level, but also on 
the regional and national level.103 
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If it was not possible to prevent a violent conflict the second pillar of R2P comes into 
effect – the “responsibility to react”. Before intervening in a conflict militarily measures 
like arms embargos, the expulsion of diplomatic staff or travel restrictions on the leaders 
should be tried to contain the conflict. Only if these measures did not have the desired 
effect, military intervention as the last resort should be considered. Furthermore, the 
Commission identified six conditions, which have to be fulfilled before going to war:104 
 The main reason to intervene ‘must be to halt or avert human suffering’; 
additionally a broad multilateral cooperation supports the right intention. 
 All diplomatic efforts have to be exhausted. In other words, all the measures 
described under “responsibility to prevent “were taken, but did not work out.  
 The planning of a military intervention should consider the least necessary 
actions to secure the people. 
 There should be a reasonable chance to successfully address the conflict. 
 The UNSC should authorize the military intervention 
 The five permanent members of the UNSC should agree not to apply their veto 
power to inhibit a resolution concerning an intervention on the purpose to halt 
people suffering, if the majority supports it. 
The central ideas of the report are that a military intervention is always the last resort and 
the threshold for the ‘just cause’ is very high. Furthermore, the UNSC is still the only 
authority to permit an intervention. Although the report emphasizes the authority of the 
UNSC, it provides an exit strategy in case the five permanent members were not able to 
agree on an intervention: 
I. consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special 
Session under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure; and 
II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations 
under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from 
the Security Council.105 
 
When we take a look at the situation before the intervention in Kosovo and apply 
this new framework to the Kosovo conflict, it can be recognized that some 
principles of the report can be perceived differently. Although the report 
emphasizes a high threshold for the ‘just cause’ and that ‘large scale of loss’ or 
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‘large scale of ethnic cleansing’ have to occur to justify a military intervention, it 
can be disputed what that means in reality. In the case of Kosovo Bill Clinton had 
not mentioned ethnic cleansing in his Statement on Kosovo the day before the 
airstrikes started. However, he had spoken about massacres and refugees. 
Furthermore the national interest had been stressed in his statement several 
times. According to the R2P report the primary reason to intervene in a conflict 
militarily has to be based on humanitarian considerations. No one can say what 
the main reason was for the U.S. and its allies to go to war. It could be the 
defense of moral principles, the fear of another collapse of the region, or the loss 
of credibility if the threats of force were lacking in substance. In respect of the 
authority of the UNSC it can be said that the U.S., UK and France tried to 
convince Russia and China to agree to a military intervention, but there was no 
mutual consent in sight. Therefore, the exit strategy provided by the report to 
address such a dilemma is a good achievement, but has to be proved in reality. 
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9. A final reflection of the US intervention 
I told the crowd bluntly, “There are those who believe Kosovo will never escape its past. 
They say that you will act towards the Serbs as the Serb military and police acted 
towards you; that you will make it impossible for Serbs to live in Kosovo. These critics 
point to tragedies such as the cowardly murder this past week of fourteen Serbs in 
Gracko, and they say, ‘See, we are right. The Kosovo Albanians are no better than 
Milošević.’ Today I want ti make a prediction that you will prove those critics wrong.” 
 
- Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, in Prishtina, July 1999.106 
 
9.1. Impact on Kosovo 
On 10 June, 1999 NATO’s airstrikes officially were ended and the Serbian forces 
withdrew from Kosovo. On the same day the Security Council Resolution 1244 was 
passed, in which the basis for future actions in Kosovo were described. The resolution 
was adopted by 14 votes in favor and one abstention from voting. China abstained and 
therefore made it possible to pass the resolution. The gratitude for persuading China not 
to use its veto power was owed to Russia, who convinced the Chinese with the 
argument, that it would be better to place Kosovo under UN administration than to one of 
NATO. The key points were that Kosovo was put under the administration of the United 
Nations, the so called UNMIK. Further an international security presence was authorized, 
which actually meant a NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping force. The U.S. was keen to 
have also the Russians participating in it, although the discussions were difficult, 
because the Russians demanded a sector outside of NATO command. After realizing 
that NATO will not accept its demand, the Russians finally gave in and deployed troops 
in one of the NATO sectors.107 For the international community and especially for the 
U.S. it was important to integrate Russia in the peacekeeping process, in the hope to 
stabilize their relations to Russia. Regarding the UNSC Resolution, which were passed 
on 10 June the publicist Hannes Hofbauer mentioned an interesting point, namely that 
the UNSC in approving the Resolution 1244 kind of legitimized the humanitarian 
intervention of NATO at a later date.108 
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The main tasks for the peacekeeping force were described in the UNSC Resolution 
1244. Firstly, they should prevent new ethnic hostilities, observe and ensure the 
ceasefire and the withdrawal of the Serbian forces. Secondly, realize the demilitarization 
of the Kosovo Liberation Army and other armed Albanians. Thirdly, it was demanded to 
establish “a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return 
home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration 
can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered”.109 In particular the last point 
was essential for the Kosovo Albanians who fled the country towards Albania and 
Macedonia over the past months.  
 
Two days after the UNSC Resolution was passed, on 12 June, the first NATO troops 
were moving into Kosovo. After a few days also the Kosovo Albanian refugees took their 
courage and headed home. Alone within the first three weeks about half a million of the 
refugees, who had left Kosovo when the bombings began, returned to Kosovo.110 The 
presence of NATO gave them confidence enough to return to their villages as soon as 
possible and therefore, the goal of the humanitarian intervention finally was achieved. 
However, the international community missed one point to consider in celebrating their 
victory – the Serbian minority in Kosovo. As already demonstrated in Chapter 8, where 
the origins of the conflict were described, the hostilities between the two ethnicities 
always flared-up as soon as one side gained predominance. The vicious circle of 
violence belonged to the Serbian and Albanian history in Kosovo. This time the returning 
Kosovo Albanian refugees were ready for revenge. NATO troops were not prepared that 
they would have to protect the Serbian minority from retaliation of victims of the war. 
Therefore, KFOR peacekeepers were wondering why now the Serbs were packing their 
belongings and heading north to follow the Serbian forces, who had withdrawn according 
to the UNSC Resolution. It seemed that the international troops were desperately 
overwhelmed by the events in the weeks after their deployment. The peacekeepers had 
not enough time to demilitarization the KLA and therefore, the following weeks were 
marked by KLA-led terror attacks against everyone who was not Albanian. Most affected 
by the attacks were Serbs and Roma, who could not count on the protection of KFOR 
peacekeepers.  
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The story of a Bulgarian UN staff member, who was killed in the streets of Prishtina 
because he replied to a question in Serbian (or Bulgarian) led to an instruction of the 
UNMIK to their Polish and Bulgarian staff members that they should avoid speaking their 
mother tongue in public.111 This incident demonstrated that there were not only hostilities 
between Albanians and the other ethnicities, but deep hatred. Furthermore, it became 
clear that the precondition for a peaceful coexistence of a multiethnic society was still far 
away. 
 
While most of the KFOR soldiers had no idea how to address the problem of “terror 
attacks” against Serbs, the British took the lead in their sector in Prishtina to ease the life 
of at least few Serbs, who still remained in the city. Murder and expulsion were part of 
the everyday life and therefore, the Serbian population dropped significantly from 20,000 
to around 1000 people.112 The tide has turned so fast and this time the Serbs are 
suffering from the violence conducted by Albanians. However, the UNMIK Administration 
needed some time to adapt itself to the new conditions, meanwhile the Serbs fled to 
Serbia or formed enclaves.113  
 
Furthermore, terrible activities of the KLA during these years were revealed in a book 
written by the former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). She describes in a chapter of this book that in the time, after the 
NATO intervention ended and KFOR troops were deployed in Kosovo, there is evidence 
that the KLA abducted between 100 to 300 Serbs and took them to Northern Albania, 
where they were killed and their organs were removed and finally sold on the black 
market for organ trafficking.114 All the events mentioned above draw a dim picture of the 
time after the humanitarian war ended and KFOR troops were deployed in Kosovo.  
While in the following weeks Albanians came back to Kosovo and were glad that the war 
ended and with its end the Serbian troops disappeared, the Serbs fled. If some did not 
left their houses voluntarily, they were forced to leave or simply killed by the KLA. The 
situation in Kosovo significantly changed, the only Serbs were living in enclaves or in the 
northern part of Kosovo near the border to Serbia. The KLA tried to take advantage of 
the power vacuum and in effect ran Kosovo for the following months. However, in 
October 2000 the first local elections took place and the UNMIK achieved to replace the 
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KLA at least partly. Even though some of the KLA members were now officially elected 
representatives.115 
 
The winners and the losers of the humanitarian interventions seemed to be obvious. The 
sentiments of this time were clearly demonstrated when Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright visited Prishtina for the first time in July 1999. She was welcomed by the Kosovo 
Albanian people with cheers and banners of “USA” and the crowd applauded when she 
appeared to speak to them. In her autobiography “Madam Secretary” she remembers 
this day: 
I said, “We must support the war crimes tribunal, because those indicted for ethnic 
cleansing and murder should be held accountable, and Slobodan Milošević must answer 
for his crimes”. The crowd yelled even louder. Then I said, “Democracy cannot be built on 
revenge. If we are to have a true victory in Kosovo, it cannot be a victory of Albanians 
over Serbs or NATO over Serbs. It must be a victory of those who believe in the rights of 
the individual over those who do not. Otherwise it is not victory. It is merely changing one 
kind of repression for another.” The audience became silent. You could have heard a pin 
drop.116 
 
Obviously she underestimated the deep hatred rooted in a century-old conflict between 
Serbs and Albanians. It became clear that the Albanians could not forget the Serbian 
repression of the last years and that the Serbs remaining in Kosovo would be suffering 
for what had happened. Nevertheless, in the view of the U.S. Administration and the 
Kosovo Albanians the humanitarian intervention was a success. On the one hand, the 
U.S. and its allies were glad to have prevented another massacre like in Srebrenica. On 
the other hand, the Kosovo Albanians could return home and were relieved that Serbian 
forces and institutions began to disappear. 
 
However, not all Serbs left Kosovo as a report of the European Stability Initiative showed 
in June 2004. In this report was stated that in 2004 still 130,000 Serbs were living in 
Kosovo, although nearly all of them in the rural parts of the region. While in the urban 
parts almost exclusively Kosovo Albanians had their homes. Nevertheless, about 75,000 
of the 130,000 Serbs lived in the areas south of the River Ibar, which is mostly populated 
by Albanians. However, the peaceful coexistence of the ethnicities in these areas 
seemed to work out. Therefore, the report suggested that the international community 
should emphasize that an undivided and multiethnic Kosovo is possible. Furthermore, it 
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should be stated that for this reason an ethnically cleansed Kosovo would never lead to 
sovereignty.  
 
Table 1: Where Kosovo Serbs live, based on primary school enrolments 
 
  
Municipality 
Primary 
school 
pupils 
Percentage 
of total 
Gjilan / Gnjilane 1,936 13.5 
Leposaviq / Leposavic 1,819 12.7 
North Mitrovica 1,630 11.3 
Kamenice / Kamenica 1,325 9.2 
Prishtina / Pristina 1,229 8.6 
Shterpce / Strpce / 1,217 8.5 
Zveqan Zvecan / 981 6.8 
Lipjan / Lipljan 969 6.7 
Zubin Potok 869 6.0 
Vushtrri / Vucitrn 619 4.3 
Viti / Vitina 474 3.3 
Obiliq / Obilic 408 2.8 
Fushe Kosove/Kosovo 
Polje 
348 2.4 
Peja / Pec 180 1.3 
Novoberde / Novo Brdo  164 1.1 
Rahovec / Orahovac 137 1 
Istog / Istok 33 0.2 
Skenderaj / Srbica 30 0.2 
Total 14,368 100.0 
 
Source: European Stability Initiative, The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity, Territory and the Future of 
Kosovo's Serbs, 7 June 2004, Berlin/Pristina. Available at: 
http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=53, accessed 7/1/12. 
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The report stated that there were no official figures about the population in Kosovo, only 
suggestion of the governments in Belgrade and Prishtina. They expected about 130,000 
Serbs living in Kosovo, which could be largely affirmed by the ESI. The institute 
concluded based on the data of school enrolments in Kosovo in 2004, which is shown in 
Table 1, that about 128,000 were living in the rural parts of the region. According to this 
figure and with regard to the last census in 1991, the report assumed that around 65,000 
Serbs were displaced between 1991-2004. Furthermore, a reason why nearly all Serbs 
in Kosovo were living in the rural parts were described in the report. It was supposed that 
after the withdrawal of Serbian forces and state form Kosovo Serbs living in the cities lost 
their jobs. Therefore, most of them left Kosovo or settled in the rural parts.117  
 
In March 2004, violent riots between Serbs and Albanians occurred once more, resulting 
in 19 people killed, 900 were injured and 29 Serbian churches and monasteries 
destroyed.118 This was a signal to the international community that it has to be alerted. In 
consequence, Secretary General Kofi Annan asked former president of Finland Martti 
Ahtisaari, who already was experienced with negotiations in the Balkans, to lead talks on 
Kosovo’s future, which took place in Vienna. The talks lasted for over a year and 
concluded in a plan with a de-facto independence of Kosovo, which was rejected by 
Serbia. Martti Ahtisaari stated that there is only one solution, namely the independence 
of Kosovo with supervision of the international community, in particular the supervision of 
the ICO and EULEX. However, to deny Kosovo’s independence would risk threaten its 
stability and peace. Furthermore, he stressed that UNMIK made important 
achievements, however, a further international administration would not be supportive of 
Kosovo’s self-government. 119 However, Russia rejected the Athisaari Plan and a new 
UNSC resolution relying on it. Therefore, the U.S. and other European States, who 
supported Kosovo’s independence, agreed that if the Albanian’s endorsed the Athisaari 
Plan, they would support Kosovo’s declaration of independence.  
 
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence and only one day later the United 
Kingdom, France and the United States already recognized its independence. However, 
their new status was only recognized by 85 of 193 member states of the UN. Among the 
states refusing to accept Kosovo’s independence are two of the permanent member 
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states of the UN Security Council – Russia and China. Furthermore, even five member 
states of the European Union - Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia – have 
not recognized Kosovo’s independence.120  
 
Finally, the Kosovo Albanian’s managed to live in an independent state without Serbian 
repression. Their struggle to get that far was bloody and lasted for centuries. 
Nevertheless, the hostilities between Serbs and Albanians remained and therefore, to 
achieve a lasting peace in the region will be a future challenge – for the Serbs, Albanians 
and the international community. 
 
9.1. Impact on US foreign policy 
On March 10, 1999, Clinton spoke to the American people to announce the end of the 
war and NATO’s victory over Milošević. Clinton said that he “can report to the American 
people that we have achieved a victory for a safer world, for our democratic values, and 
for a stronger America.”121 Furthermore, he emphasized the constructive cooperation of 
the NATO member states in Kosovo: 
The result will be security and dignity for the people of Kosovo, achieved by an alliance 
that stood together in purpose and resolve, assisted by the diplomatic efforts of Russia. 
This victory brings a new hope that when a people are singled out for destruction because 
of their heritage and religious faith and we can do something about it, the world will not 
look the other way.[…] NATO has achieved this success as a united alliance, ably led by 
Secretary General Solana and General Clark. Nineteen democracies came together and 
stayed together through the stiffest military challenge in NATO's 50-year history.122 
 
President Clinton seemed relieved that the intervention finally ended and the option of 
deploying ground troops had not been discussed any further in order to win the war. An 
involvement of ground forces would have posed the threat of American casualties and 
therefore, less support from the American public. Although they were well aware that 
airstrikes would not suffice as opinion polls showed on April 6, 1999 conducted by 
Washington Post–ABC News Poll on Kosovo. 
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Table 2: Opinion Poll on Kosovo, April 6,1999 (Question 1) 
Just your best guess, do you think air strikes WILL be enough to stop Serbia from 
continuing its attacks in Kosovo, or do you think ground troops will have to be sent 
in to try to end the conflict?  
             Air strikes    Need ground    No 
                enough         troops    opinion 
4/5/99            25             68         7 
 
Table 3: Opinion Poll on Kosovo, April 6, 1999 (Question 2) 
Suppose the bombing does NOT stop Serbia's military action in Kosovo. Would you 
support or oppose the United States and its European allies sending in ground 
troops to try to end the conflict in Kosovo? (GET ANSWER, THEN ASK:) Would 
you support/oppose this strongly or somewhat?  
          ----------Support--------   ----------Oppose-------      No 
          NET   Strongly   Somewhat   NET   Strongly   Somewhat   opin. 
4/5/99     55      31         24       41      29         12        4 
 
Source of Table 2 and 3: Washington Post- ABC News Poll: Kosovo, 6 April,1999. Available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data040699.htm, accessed 5/1/12. 
 
The polls show that most Americans thought airstrikes would be not enough to end the 
war, but when it comes to the question if they would support the deployment of ground 
troops the difference between those who would support and those who would oppose it 
got smaller. That means, that the American public was very skeptically if airstrikes would 
lead to success, but the willingness to send ground troops was not that high. Clinton 
seemed very sensitive about the public opinion and in this respect he made the right 
decision to reject the deployment of ground troops. According to William Hyland, a 
former editor of the Journal Foreign Affairs, Clinton was a president obsessed “with 
doing the popular thing”.123 
 
However, it is hard to say if Clinton would not have started a military intervention when 
there was less public support. What we know is that the public support for airstrikes 
against Serbia was already high at the beginning and even rose in the course of the 
intervention according to Table 4. 
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Table 4: Opinion Poll on Kosovo, April 6, 1999 (Question 3) 
Do you support or oppose the United States and its European allies conducting air 
strikes against Serbia?  
          Support    Oppose    No opinion 
4/5/99        68        29           3 
3/30/99       55        33          11 
3/28/99       55        33          12 
3/26/99       60        31           9 
 
Source: Washington Post- ABC News Poll: Kosovo, 6 April,1999. Available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data040699.htm, accessed 5/1/12. 
 
In Clinton’s address on the Kosovo Agreement, he pointed out that the work in Kosovo is 
not over after the intervention, but will start with the NATO-led peacekeeping forces to 
ensure peace in Kosovo. However, the tasks will be shared between the U.S., European 
countries, Russia and the United Nations He stressed that the majority of the 
peacekeepers will be provided by European Allies and the United Nations will organize 
the new administration in Kosovo.124  
 
While most of the military intervention was carried out by the U.S., the peace building 
process relied on the Europeans and the United Nations. It can be assumed, that Clinton 
wanted to act in accordance with an international organization like to UN to give the 
peace building process more credibility and to reconcile with the Russians, who agreed 
to deploy peacekeeping troops in one of the NATO-led sectors in Kosovo. Furthermore, 
both terms of Clinton’s presidency the Administration was occupied with the Balkan 
crises and therefore, the time had come to restrain their commitment in the region and let 
the Europeans handle the future of the region.  
 
In this context, the scholar Robert Kagan made some interesting remarks in his book “Of 
Paradise and Power”. He pointed out that in the case of Kosovo not only the U.S. 
ignored the veto of the UNSC, but also many European countries. They agreed that 
something had to be done and consequently coordinated with the U.S. a humanitarian 
intervention within NATO. Therefore, even for the Europeans the humanitarian aspect 
and the fear to witness another Holocaust on European soil counted more than the 
authorization of the United Nations.125 It is unlikely that the U.S. would have acted 
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without having its NATO allies on their side, therefore, accusations that the U.S. acted 
unilaterally seemed exaggerated.  
 
The perception of Clinton’s foreign policy performance was mixed. Of course the 
Bosnians and Albanians saw him as a hero, who saved their lives because he was 
courageous enough to get involved in the Balkan crisis. In the European countries he 
enjoyed a good reputation as peacemaker and even the relation to Russia’s president 
Boris Yeltsin was particularly friendly, at least most of Clinton’s presidency. However, at 
home he was criticized much more. William Hyland complained that Clinton “glorified 
internationalism and multilateralism, the UN and collective security, and the necessity of 
achieving a moral consensus while scoffing at such crude concepts as the balance of 
power.”126 A more contradictory approach to Clinton’s foreign policy was given by Joseph 
Fallon, who took the view that “in Washington’s eyes, the end of the Cold War meant a 
transition from a bipolar world, which functioned within a set of political, military, and 
legal restraints, to a unipolar one. The U.S. government was now the world’s 
hyperpower, without rival or limitation.”127 He assumed that the Balkan wars were used to 
demonstrate America’s superpower. First of all towards Russia, because the U.S. 
launched airstrikes against a state supported by Russia and they could do nothing to 
stop the intervention. Furthermore, the U.S. condemned Serbian nationalism on the 
ground that all nationalism “undermines the legitimacy of the virtues of multiethnic states 
and transnational corporations.”128 The perception of Clinton’s foreign policy is highly 
diverse. On the one hand, he was criticized for being too much a multilateralist and too 
keen to work within international organizations, on the other hand it was suggested that 
his foreign policy intended to ensure America’s superpower in a unipolar world, which 
emerged after the end of the Cold War. Both views show the dividedness of the 
perception of the Clinton Administration’s record during the eight years of being in office. 
 
However, concerning the relationship between the U.S. and the European Union, Robert 
Kagan set up the assumption that the European desire for multilateral cooperation within 
a framework of international organizations is based on Europe’s military weakness. After 
the end of the Cold War the European countries missed the point to establish their own 
military force. Furthermore, the Europeans felt not the need to invest more in their 
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military, because they believed that in the case of necessity they could rely on America’s 
power. In this context, the war in the Balkans exceeded the European skills, while the 
U.S. was prepared to fight two wars simultaneously in two different world regions.129 
Concerning the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, this seemed to be true, because 
the U.S. provided the vast majority of equipment and military staff. This only changed 
during the years of the peacekeeping mission, where the majority of the soldiers were 
Europeans. 
With regard to Kagan’s assumption that the European multilateral perspective is just a 
reaction of its weakness, because otherwise they would exercise power more frequently, 
Mary Kaldor posed the question if the concept of non-intervention becomes obsolete 
when crimes against humanity and genocide could be prevented?130 Although 
Europeans often criticized the U.S. for acting unilaterally, in the case of Kosovo both 
worked together to stop ethnic cleansing. In this respect the scholar Ulrich Beck 
concluded that the Kosovo conflict demonstrated that a military defense of human rights 
on the territory of a sovereign state can take place without the authorization of the 
Security Council and the violations of international law, and nevertheless be supported 
by western countries with high moral standards. He called it “illegal legitimate war”, 
because the humanitarian intervention obviously violated international law and therefore 
was illegal, however, but most of the western countries and its people supported the 
intervention on moral grounds. Beck assumed that the reason for the Europeans was the 
fear to witness once more genocide in Europe and therefore, they had to decide between 
violating international law or human rights.131 
 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the Clinton foreign policy had a significant impact on 
Kosovo, not only because ethnic cleansing was prevented and Kosovo Albanian lives 
were saved, but without Clinton’s intervention an independent Kosovo would not exist. 
However, the intervention showed lacks in its performance and the peacekeepers were 
not prepared for the situation in a post-war Kosovo with ethnic hostilities. Furthermore, 
European countries cooperated with the United States under the flag of NATO, to 
conduct a humanitarian intervention on moral grounds. The Americans stand up to its 
moral principles and their goal to strengthen NATO in Europe was achieved with the 
victory over Milošević. 
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III. Final Part 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
The Kosovo conflict and its outcome have prompted  
a debate of worldwide importance. 
- Kofi Annan, Former Secretary General of the United Nations, 1999132– 
 
The aim of this research paper was to analyze in how far the U.S. foreign policy under 
the Clinton Administration was significant for the course of the Kosovo conflict. 
Throughout the contextual analysis it was attempted to explain, firstly, the U.S. foreign 
policy during the Clinton years and its effects on world politics; secondly, how the U.S. 
dealt with the multilateral attempt to prevent the collapse of the Southern Balkans 
because of ethnic rivalries; and thirdly, the decision of the U.S. and its allies to launch a 
humanitarian intervention to contain ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. 
 
As a whole the paper is based on primary and secondary sources, which includes 
statements, speeches and interviews of officials, agreements, resolutions and reports, as 
well as articles of scholars and discourse books. Furthermore, the attendance of several 
lectures on the topic and the participation in the Kosovo Conference in Vienna 
contributed to and completed this research. Finally, a closer look should be taken at the 
hypotheses set up at the beginning of the research to figure out if they could be 
confirmed. 
 
The hypothesis i) was largely confirmed, although some grey areas remain. 
i) If the reason for the Clinton Administration to intervene in the Kosovo conflict was 
mainly based on moral grounds and in particular to prevent ethnic cleansing, 
then a military intervention was justified, even though it was illegal according 
to international law. 
 
The analysis showed that according to the new framework of the “Responsibility to 
Protect”, established to address violent conflicts in the 21st century, the primary purpose 
to intervene militarily in a conflict has to be based on moral principles in order to prevent 
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or halt ethnic cleansing. It can be said that President Clinton emphasized in his 
statement on Kosovo - only a short time before NATO launched the airstrikes against 
Serbia - that the U.S. decided to conduct a humanitarian intervention to prevent further 
massacres and refugee floods, because it was a moral imperative. Therefore, the cause 
for intervention was mainly based on moral grounds. The U.S. and its allies sought 
permission of the UNSC, but Russia and China signaled that they will not agree to a 
military intervention. The reasons were therefore assumed to have something to do with 
conflicts they were confronted with at home, namely Chechnya in the case of Russia and 
Tibet in the case of China. In this context, the guidelines of the report on R2P pointed out 
that if the five permanent members of the UNSC cannot agree on a military intervention 
conducted to prevent ethnic cleansing or genocide, although the majority supports it, 
then in order to execute ”the responsibility to protect” the General Assembly in an 
Emergency Special Session or regional and sub-regional organizations can be 
addressed. The majority of the UNSC supported the intervention and the U.S. acted 
together with several other states on a multilateral basis within an intergovernmental 
military alliance.  
 
Furthermore, the victims of the conflict – the Kosovo Albanians - requested the NATO 
states to use force in order to save their lives. In general, most of the points concerning a 
justified intervention were met, although there are some limitations. On the one hand, no 
one can say with certainty if the main reason for Bill Clinton was to intervene in the 
conflict to stop ethnic cleansing. It is assumed, but the national interest and the loss of 
credibility may have played a role as well. On the other hand, after the U.S. had learned 
that an agreement in the UNSC over military actions in the Kosovo conflict had no 
reasonable chance, the U.S. and its allies consequently went to war without the authority 
of the UN. If they saw no chance to get the permission of the UN or the time was running 
short to prevent further killings in Kosovo is difficult to say. 
 
The hypothesis ii) could be confirmed as well. 
ii) If it is assumed that the liberal theory is best suited to explain the behavior of the 
Clinton Administration, then U.S. domestic policy influenced the acting in the 
conflict. 
 
Overall domestic actors as well as the public opinion were taken into account in respect 
of the decision on how to proceed with the humanitarian intervention. Several officials of 
the Clinton Administration, Senators and scholars had an influence in the course of the 
intervention. It was not easy to get support for sending troops to Kosovo from national 
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security officials like the Defense Secretary Cohen or General Hugh Shelton. Further, 
mostly Republican Senators, like Donald Nickles of Oklahoma, were not convinced that 
the killings thus far gave enough reason to intervene in Kosovo. However, influential 
Senator Richard Lugar of the Republican Party supported the actions in Kosovo, just like 
most of the Democratic Senators like Joe Biden. Scholars like Noam Chomsky, who is a 
critical observer of U.S. foreign policy, dismissed the perception that Clinton went to war 
on moral grounds and criticized publicly that not all diplomatic efforts were taken to 
prevent using force. Furthermore, as could be shown, the public opinion supported 
Clinton’s decision to launch airstrikes against Serbia, but was reserved on deploying 
ground troops. Therefore, it can be assumed that President Clinton’s decision to reject 
ground forces in the Kosovo conflict emphatically was associated with the controversial 
debate and reluctant attitude in American society. 
 
The hypothesis iii) is highly connected with hypothesis i) and could therefore be 
confirmed partially. 
iii) If the United States, along with two other permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council, UK and France, had exhausted all diplomatic 
means to convince the other permanent members, Russia and China, to 
permit military actions against Serbian forces to prevent ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo, then acting on their own authority to save lives was inevitable. 
 
The U.S. and its allies stressed that they had exhausted all diplomatic means to 
persuade Milošević to agree to peace. The efforts of the international community were 
described in chapter 1, where a background to the NATO intervention was provided and 
the Rambouillet talks were described in detail. Till the day before NATO launched its 
airstrikes high officials of the U.S., the European Union, the OSCE and Russia were in 
Belgrade to negotiate a final Peace Agreement with the Serbian leader. In the meantime 
they learned that Milošević assembled about 40,000 troops at the Kosovo border while 
he was talking to them. Therefore, the U.S. and its allies decided that the diplomatic 
efforts came to an end. In respect of the two permanent members of the UNSC, Russia 
and China, the efforts to convince them to permit a military intervention were intensive. 
However, Russia emphasized that it would veto any military intervention in the Kosovo 
conflict and therefore categorically excluded an agreement in the UNSC.  
 
For the above mentioned reasons, the U.S. and its allies, who were determined to halt 
further massacres of the Kosovo Albanian people, decided to act on their own authority 
under NATO on a multilateral basis. Nevertheless, it cannot be said what would have 
happened if the international negotiations had been continued without using force and if 
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the Serbian forces in Kosovo had committed massacres on the Kosovo Albanian people 
during that time. After the massacre in Srebrenica the international community was 
aware of what Milošević was capable of and therefore, they exercised their 
“responsibility to protect”. Witnessing another attempt of ethnic cleansing before the eyes 
of the world public and being confronted with accusations of having left the Kosovo 
Albanians on their own and consequently not learning from history, seemed not to be an 
option. 
 
Finally, it can be assumed that the U.S. Administration under Bill Clinton thoroughly 
considered whether to conduct a humanitarian intervention without permission of the 
UNSC. The Administration was perceived to have a multilateral approach to foreign 
policy and especially Bill Clinton was perceived as a multilateralist close to liberal theory 
who is attached to international organizations and agreements and therefore not eager to 
go to war without necessity. This was particularly the case after the debacle in Somalia 
with casualties among American soldiers, shortly after he entered the White House 
office. Furthermore, to endanger the relationship between the U.S. and Russia with the 
decision to act in Kosovo under the flag of NATO seemed not to be a light-hearted 
decision of Bill Clinton. However, it can be assumed that Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright played a major role in the decision-making process on intervening in Kosovo. 
She was perceived as the driving force to act militarily after the diplomatic efforts 
seemed without a chance to establish a Peace Agreement. 
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11. Appendix 
Appendix One - Demographic shifts in Kosovo from 1948-1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See: Julie Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1999), from ‘Jugoslavija 1918-1988, statistički godišnjak’ (1989), pp.42-3; 
‘Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije za 1992, dodinu’ (1992), pp62-3, as cited in Milan 
Vučković and Goran Nikolić, Stanovništvo Kosova u razdoblju od 1918. Do 1991. Godine 
(munich 1996), pp.108-9 
Population
%
Population
%
Population
%
Population
%
Population
%
Population
%
Albanians
498
,242
68
.5
524
,559
64
.9
646
,805
67
.2
916
,168
73
.7
1
,226
,736
77
.4
1607690
*
82
.2
Serbs
171
,911
23
.6
189
,869
23
.5
227
,016
23
.6
228
,264
18
.4
209
,498
13
.2
195
,301
9
.9
M
ontenegrins
28
,050
3
.9
31
,343
3
.9
37
,588
3
.9
31
,555
2
.5
27
,028
1
.7
20
,045
1
.0
M
uslim
s
9
,679
1
.3
6
,241
0
.8
8
,026
0
.8
26
,357
2
.1
58
,562
3
.7
57
,408
2
.9
Gypsies
11
,230
1
.5
11
,904
1
.5
3
,202
0
.3
14
,593
1
.2
34
,126
2
.2
42
,806
2
.2
Turks
1
,315
0
.2
34
,583
4
.3
25
,784
2
.7
12
,244
1
.0
12
,513
0
.8
10
,838
0
.5
C
roats
5
,290
0
.7
6
,201
0
.8
7
,251
0
.8
8
,264
0
.7
8
,717
0
.6
8
,161
0
.4
Others
2
,103
0
.3
3
,541
0
.3
8
,316
0
.7
6
,248
0
.4
7
,260
0
.4
12
,498
0
.7
 
 
 
 
 Total
727
,820
100
.0
808
,141
100
.0
963
,988
100
.0
1
,243
,693
100
.0
1
,584
,441
100
.0
1
,954
,747
100
.0
*Estim
ate
 of
 the
 Federal
 Institute
 for
 Statistics
,
 based
 on
 the
 data
 on
 the
 natural
 augm
entation
 and
 migrations
 during
 the
 previous
 period
 (1981
-1990)
1991
1948
1953
1961
1971
1981
68 
 
Appendix Two - Ahtissari-Chernomyrdin-Milosevic Agreement 
 
Proposal presented by Martti Ahtisaari and Victor Chernomyrdin to President Slobodan 
Milosevic, 2 June 1999. 
 
Annex 2 
 
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of 
the Kosovo crisis: 
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. 
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces 
according to a rapid timetable. 
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil 
and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives. 
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to 
establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to 
their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. 
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil 
presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United 
Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while 
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing 
institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in 
Kosovo. 
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be 
permitted to return to perform the following functions: 
- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence; 
- Marking/clearing minefields; 
- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; 
- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded 
access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations. 
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework 
agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of 
the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other  countries of the region, and the 
demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not 
delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions. 
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the 
crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern 
Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, 
economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation. 
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth 
above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which 
are specified in the footnote below.1 A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly 
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concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the 
roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo: 
Withdrawal 
- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule 
and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be 
withdrawn; 
Returning personnel 
- Equipment associated with returning personnel; 
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities; 
- Timetable for their return; 
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation; 
- Rules governing their relationship to the international security 
presence and the international civil mission. 
Notes 
1 Other required elements: 
- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete 
withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety 
zone within 48 hours; 
- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision 
of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number 
(hundreds, not thousands); 
- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals; 
- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the 
previously determined time for completion of withdrawals. 
 
 
See: Annex 2 of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999),http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 
5/1/12. 
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Appendix Three - Annex of the Athisaari Plan 
 
Main provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement 
I. General 
1. The aim of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is to define 
the provisions necessary for a future Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable. It 
includes detailed measures to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of 
communities and their members, the effective decentralization of government, and the 
preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. In addition, the 
Settlement prescribes constitutional, economic and security provisions, all of which are 
aimed at contributing to the development of a multiethnic, democratic and prosperous 
Kosovo. An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provided for a future 
international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the 
Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability 
throughout Kosovo. The provisions of the Settlement will take precedence over all other 
legal provisions in Kosovo. 
II. Provisions of the Settlement 
2. Kosovo’s governance. The Settlement defines the basic framework for Kosovo’s 
future governance. Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically 
and with full respect for the rule of law and the highest level of internationally recognized 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Kosovo shall adopt a constitution to enshrine 
such principles. While the Settlement does not prescribe a complete constitution, it 
defines key elements that must form part of that constitution. Kosovo shall have the right 
to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the right to seek 
membership in international organizations. 
3. Rights of communities. With respect to the protection and promotion of community 
rights, the Settlement addresses key aspects to be protected, including culture, 
language, educations and symbols. Albanian and Serbian shall be the two official 
languages of Kosovo, while other community languages — such as Turkish, Bosnian 
and Roma — shall have the status of languages in official use. To ensure adequate 
representation of communities in public life, the Settlement defines specific 
representation mechanisms for key institutions. Communities that are not in the majority 
in Kosovo shall continue to be guaranteed representation in the Kosovo Assembly. To 
protect their rights in the legislative process, the Settlement also provides that key laws 
of particular interest to communities may only be enacted if a majority of their 
representatives present and voting in the Kosovo Assembly agree to their adoption. 
4. Decentralization. The extensive decentralization provisions are intended to promote 
good governance, transparency, effectiveness and fiscal sustainability in public service. 
The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needs and concerns of the Kosovo 
Serb community, which shall have a high degree of control over its own affairs. The 
decentralization elements include, among other things: enhanced municipal 
competencies for Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (such as in the areas of secondary 
health care and higher education); extensive municipal autonomy in financial matters, 
including the ability to receive transparent funding from Serbia; provisions on inter-
municipal partnerships and cross-border cooperation with Serbian institutions; and the 
establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb majority municipalities. 
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5. Justice system. The Settlement includes specific provisions to ensure that the justice 
system is integrated, independent, professional and impartial. It provides for 
mechanisms to achieve a justice system that is inclusive of all communities, and in which 
the judiciary and prosecution service reflect the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo. 
Moreover, the Settlement provides for, and is premised upon, the access to justice of all 
persons in Kosovo. 
6. Protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage. The Settlement 
places great emphasis upon ensuring the unfettered and undisturbed existence and 
operation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. The Church and its internal 
organization shall be recognized explicitly by the Kosovo authorities, its property shall be 
inviolable, and it shall enjoy tax and customs duty privileges. Protective zones shall be 
created around more than 40 key religious and cultural sites. Without prejudice to 
ownership of the property in protective zones, specific restrictions shall apply to activities 
within those zones to guarantee the peaceful existence and functioning of major religious 
and cultural sites. NATO shall also provide additional physical security for selected sites, 
until such time as the military presence decides the conditions have been met for a 
transfer of their protection responsibilities to the Kosovo Police Force. 
7. Returns/protection of property. All refugees and internally displaced persons from 
Kosovo shall have the right to return and reclaim their property and personal 
possessions based upon a voluntary and informed decision. The Settlement reaffirms 
the principle that displaced persons shall be able to return to a place of their choice in 
Kosovo, and not only to their original place of residence. The Settlement also calls upon 
Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate fully with each other and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross to resolve the fate of missing persons. 
8. Economy. The Settlement includes specific provisions designed to promote and 
safeguard sustainable economic development in Kosovo. The Settlement prescribes 
transparent procedures to settle disputed property claims and for a continued 
privatization process, both with substantial international involvement. In addition, the 
Settlement defines mechanisms to determine Kosovo’s share of Serbia’s external debt, 
and to address the issue of property restitution. 
9. Security. The Settlement provides for a professional, multi-ethnic and democratic 
Kosovo security sector, encouraging significant local ownership in its development, while 
retaining a level of international oversight necessary for ultimate success in this sensitive 
area. The Kosovo Police Force shall have a unified chain of command throughout 
Kosovo, with local police officers reflecting the ethnic composition of the municipality in 
which they serve. In Kosovo Serb majority municipalities, the Municipal Assembly shall 
have enhanced competencies in the selection of the police station commander. A new 
professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force shall be established within one year 
after the end of the 120-day transition period envisaged in the Settlement. It shall have a 
maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members. The Settlement stipulates 
that the current Kosovo Protection Corps shall be dissolved within one year after the end 
of the transition period. 
10. Future international presence. In general, Kosovo shall be responsible for the 
implementation of the Settlement. To safeguard and support such implementation, the 
Settlement defines the role and powers of the future international civilian and military 
presences. 
11. International Civilian Representative. The International Civilian Representative, 
who shall be double-hatted as the European Union Special Representative and who 
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shall be appointed by an International Steering Group, shall be the ultimate supervisory 
authority over implementation of the Settlement. The International Civilian 
Representative shall have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall have 
strong corrective powers to ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. Among 
his/her powers is the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities 
and sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she determines to be 
inconsistent with the Settlement. The mandate of the International Civilian 
Representative shall continue until the International Steering Group determines that 
Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement. 
12. European Security and Defence Policy Mission. The European Security and 
Defence Policy Mission shall monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule 
of law in Kosovo. It shall have the right to investigate and prosecute independently 
sensitive crimes, such as organized crime, inter-ethnic crime, financial crime, and war 
crimes. In addition, it shall have limited executive authority to ensure Kosovo’s rule of law 
institutions are effective and functional, such as in the areas of border control and crowd 
and riot control. 
13. International Military Presence. The International Military Presence shall be a 
NATO-led military mission. It shall continue the current task of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
to provide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo, in conjunction with the 
International Civilian Representative and in support of Kosovo’s institutions until such 
time as Kosovo’s institutions are capable of assuming the full range of security 
responsibilities. 
14. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Kosovo. 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with an extensive field 
presence in Kosovo, is requested to assist in the monitoring necessary for a successful 
implementation of the Settlement. 
III. Implementation 
15. Upon the entry into force of the Settlement, there shall be a 120-day transition period 
during which the existing mandate of UNMIK remains unchanged. 
16. During the transition period, the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the 
International Civilian Representative, shall be responsible for approving a new 
constitution and the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Settlement and 
the establishment of the new Kosovo institutions it calls for. The constitution and 
legislation shall become effective immediately upon the conclusion of the transition 
period. 
17. At the end of the transition period the UNMIK mandate shall expire and all legislative 
and executive authority vested in UNMIK shall be transferred en bloc to the authorities of 
Kosovo, in accordance with the Settlement. 
18. Finally, general and local elections are to be held within nine months of the 
entry into force of the Settlement. 
 
See: http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf, accessed 5/1/12. 
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Abstract 
The intent of the Diploma thesis is to analyze the U.S. foreign policy of the Clinton 
Administration in the course of the Kosovo conflict. The thesis tries to evaluate the 
impact of Bill Clinton’s presidency (1993-2001) on Kosovo and consequently on the 
international community. This is done through a contextual analysis which attempts to 
explain, firstly, the U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton years and its effects on world 
politics; secondly, how the U.S. dealt with the multilateral attempt to prevent the collapse 
of the Southern Balkans because of ethnic rivalries; and thirdly, the decision of the U.S. 
and its allies to launch a humanitarian intervention to contain ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. 
 
By means of the liberal theory and multilateralism it is argued that the U.S. 
Administration under Bill Clinton thoroughly considered whether to conduct a 
humanitarian intervention in the Kosovo conflict without the permission of the UNSC, 
because the efforts to convince the two permanent members of the UNSC, Russia and 
China, to permit a military intervention were intensive. However, Russia emphasized that 
it would veto any military intervention in the Kosovo conflict and thus categorically 
excluded an agreement in the UNSC. Therefore, it is claimed that the U.S. 
Administration would have preferred to act under the authority of the United Nations, 
however, because this was not possible they acted within the framework of NATO. 
Furthermore, American domestic actors as well as the public opinion were taken into 
account in respect of the decision on how to proceed with the humanitarian intervention. 
Hence, the decisions of President Clinton to go to war on moral grounds and to reject 
ground forces were associated with the controversial debate and reluctant attitude in 
American society. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit versucht mithilfe einer qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse zu 
erforschen, inwiefern die amerikanische Außenpolitik der Clinton Administration den 
Verlauf des Kosovo Konfliktes beeinflusst hat. Die Arbeit legt die Auswirkungen der 
Präsidentschaft von Bill Clinton (1993 -2001) auf den Kosovo und schlussendlich auf die 
gesamte international Gemeinschaft dar. Im Laufe einer Kontextanalyse wurde diese 
Thematik von zweierlei Gesichtspunkten aus bearbeitet. Einerseits wurde die 
Ausrichtung der amerikanischen Außenpolitik während Clintons Präsidentschaft und 
deren Einfluss auf die Weltpolitik beleuchtet andererseits wurde der Versuch der 
Vereinigten Staaten mit multilateralen Bemühungen den durch ethnische Rivalitäten 
hervorgerufenen Zusammenbruch des südlichen Balkanraumes, zu verhindern, 
bearbeitet. Außerdem wurde die Entscheidung der USA und ihrer Verbündeten 
betrachtet, im Rahmen der NATO Luftangriffe auf Serbien zu starten, um ethnische 
Säuberungen im Kosovo zu verhindern. 
 
Hinsichtlich der Theorien des Liberalismus und Multilateralismus ist zu sagen, dass die 
Clinton Administration, bevorzugt mit der ausdrücklichen Genehmigung der Vereinten 
Nationen, die humanitäre Intervention durchgeführt hätte. Der Versuch der drei 
ständigen Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen, USA, Großbrittanien 
und Frankreich, die beiden anderen ständigen Mitglieder, Russland und China, von 
einem militärischen Eingreifen in den Kosovo Konflikt zu überzeugen, war zwar bemüht, 
aber aussichtslos. Russland machte von vornherein klar, dass es einer militärischen 
Intervention unter keinen Umständen zustimmen werde. Daher sahen die USA und ihre 
Verbündeten keine andere Möglichkeit als ein multilaterales Handeln im Namen der 
NATO zu etablieren, um weitere Massaker an den Kosovo Albanern zu verhindern. 
Darüber hinaus beeinflussten innenpolitische Akteure, sowie die öffentliche Meinung die 
Entscheidungen der Clinton Administration maßgeblich. Der Entschluss zu einer 
militärischen humanitären Intervention, sowie deren Durchführung waren davon 
betroffen. Im Besonderen die Entsendung von Bodentruppen in den Kosovo wurde von 
Clinton abgelehnt aufgrund kontroverser Debatten und der ablehnenden Haltung der 
amerikanischen Öffentlichkeit. 
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